This article reconstructs the history of direct interventions in exchange rate markets performed by the leading Italian banks of issue: the Banca Nazionale until 1893, then the Banca d'Italia between 1894 and 1913. The article shows that this type of operation represented a constant and relevant commitment for both institutions; interventions were made in the bills and/or the bonds market, sometimes also in conjunction with increases in the discount rate. Although often successful in the initial stages, until 1904 institutional provisions severely constrained the accumulation of foreign assets in the banks’ portfolios therefore reducing the viability, and hence the overall effectiveness, of these interventions.

I model an international payments system with a financial center and periphery to reproduce various aspects of the International Gold Standard. This period was characterized by frequent crises associated with scarce stocks of reserves, high short-term interest rates with subsequent gold inflows, and transmission of output contractions across countries. I find that a common international currency and no legal restrictions on exchange help the periphery share reserves with the financial center, improving the world's welfare and mitigating output losses due to reserve crises. Also, the center has incentives for restrictive rediscounting while the periphery has motives for developing central banking.