Chapter 1 articulates the theory of institutional congruence. I argue that persistent forms of social cooperation at the grassroots are revitalized following institutional reform because some communities have inherited robust social institutions that stipulate appropriate social behavior. I elaborate on the theory’s dual mechanisms of shared social identification and dense cross-village network ties to illustrate how institutional congruence helps local elites navigate the two-level political game introduced by decentralization: local elected officials face pressure within their villages on a first level that are not always compatible with their incentives at the second level of the local state itself, where they must negotiate with other elites from other villages. When shared social institutions stretch across the many villages of a local government, elites find it easier to negotiate at the second level of the local state because these social institutions reorient them toward group-based goals. As a consequence, local representation and redistribution is expected to be broader across space under conditions of high congruence, but contentious and targeted when it is low.

Why are some communities able to come together to improve their collective lot while others are not? This book offers a novel answer to this question by looking at variation in local government performance in decentralized West Africa: local actors are better able to cooperate around basic service delivery when their formal jurisdictional boundaries overlap with informal social institutions, or norms of appropriate comportment in the public sphere demarcated by group boundaries. In this introductory chapter, I lay out the main contours of my theory as well as the implications that the argument holds for key debates in Comparative Politics, including the use of narratives as a lens into actors’ political strategies, the social identities we prioritize in our research, prospects for state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, and our understanding of how historical legacies shape contemporary development outcomes.

Why are some communities able to come together to improve their collective lot while others are not? This book offers a novel answer to this question by looking at variation in local government performance in decentralized West Africa: local actors are better able to cooperate around basic service delivery when their formal jurisdictional boundaries overlap with informal social institutions, or norms of appropriate comportment in the public sphere demarcated by group boundaries. In this introductory chapter, I lay out the main contours of my theory as well as the implications that the argument holds for key debates in Comparative Politics, including the use of narratives as a lens into actors’ political strategies, the social identities we prioritize in our research, prospects for state-building in sub-Saharan Africa, and our understanding of how historical legacies shape contemporary development outcomes.

Chapter 1 articulates the theory of institutional congruence. I argue that persistent forms of social cooperation at the grassroots are revitalized following institutional reform because some communities have inherited robust social institutions that stipulate appropriate social behavior. I elaborate on the theory’s dual mechanisms of shared social identification and dense cross-village network ties to illustrate how institutional congruence helps local elites navigate the two-level political game introduced by decentralization: local elected officials face pressure within their villages on a first level that are not always compatible with their incentives at the second level of the local state itself, where they must negotiate with other elites from other villages. When shared social institutions stretch across the many villages of a local government, elites find it easier to negotiate at the second level of the local state because these social institutions reorient them toward group-based goals. As a consequence, local representation and redistribution is expected to be broader across space under conditions of high congruence, but contentious and targeted when it is low.