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1 results

  • 28 - Understanding and Evaluating the Moral World in Infancy

  • from Part VI - Emotional and Social Development
  • Edited by Jeffrey J. Lockman, Tulane University, Louisiana, Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda, New York University
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of Infant Development
    Published online:
    26 September 2020
    Print publication:
    13 August 2020, pp 777-804

  • Summary

    A capacity for moral judgment, whereby certain actions and individuals are deemed good or bad and worthy of praise or punishment, is one of the defining characteristics of human social life. Although exactly which acts and individuals are considered worthy of moral consideration varies across cultures, it appears that all humans nevertheless share an overall tendency to see some things, commonly within the broad domains of harm and fairness, as morally right, good, permissible, or obligatory, and others as wrong, bad, impermissible, or forbidden (Brown, 1991). Perhaps most notably, humans do not merely evaluate the acts and individuals that directly influence themselves and their loved ones, but also readily evaluate those whose positive and negative acts solely influence unknown others. That is, the human moral sense does not appear to be characterized by concerns for what is right or wrong for me, but instead what is right or wrong in general.