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The study concludes that the case of Libya fully exposed the potential as well as the complexities inherent in the responsibility to protect. The political-moral imperative encapsulated by the principle played a decisive role in the Security Council’s decision to authorize the use of force in order to protect civilians – which most likely averted mass atrocities. However, the responsibility to protect provided a highly fragile basis for military enforcement action without host state consent – by leaving essential questions regarding the legitimacy of international authority and the relation of international actors to local actors unresolved. The chapter examines the implications of the Libyan case for the normative development of the responsibility to protect. Subsequently, a number of conclusions are drawn regarding specific aspects of the principle. These concern the concept of "the international community"; collective security arrangements; questions of neutrality and impartiality; and consistency between the intervention and pre- and post-intervention politics.
This chapter assesses NATO’s intervention in Libya, Operation Unified Protector, which lasted from March 31, 2011, when NATO took over command and control of all military operations in Libya, until October 31, 2011, when the operation ended. The analysis focuses on the overriding questions of how and by whom collective action in the sense of military enforcement was taken; and on the related question of how international actors employing military force related to local actors in Libya. The chapter analyzes how NATO prepared for Operation Unified Protector and how the operation evolved. While the broad Security Council mandate provided NATO with a wide marge de manoeuvre, the military commanders had to face a number of crucial political predicaments related to the duration of the operation; the unspecified nature of the Security Council mandate; and questions of impartiality, neutrality, and regime change. Finally, the chapter examines the complex relationship between NATO and the United Nations, which had a decisive impact on the manner in which Operation Unified Protector was conducted – and assessed.
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