An analysis of the orders of the CCI and the CCP suggest that each national competition authority has its own distinct interpretive strategy which reflects the extent of compatibility and legitimacy generated for the competition legislation in the adoption stage. This chapter examines and compares the CCI and CCP’s interpretation of provisions for horizontal and vertical anti-competitive agreements to extrapolate some understanding of their overall interpretive strategies. The chapter demonstrates that despite the comparable antecedents of the relevant provisions of the Indian and Pakistani Acts, the CCP relied more heavily on foreign precedents in interpreting these provisions than the CCI. The chapter further demonstrates that the disparate interpretive strategies of the CCI and CCP may be explained by the disparity in the compatibility and legitimacy of the acts and to the CCP’s need to leverage foreign precedents to assert its international legitimacy, which in turn helped it to enhance its domestic legitimacy. The chapter finally argues that in addition to reflecting the compatibility and legitimacy generated at the adoption stage, the interpretative strategies adopted by the CCI and the CCP also shape the competition and legitimacy of the acts and chart their implementation trajectory.

Chapter 3 studies VSS under EU competition rules. While in the debate on competition law and sustainability it is often argued in favour of a larger space for private sustainability initiatives, the chapter studies the possibility of using competition rules to tackle the implications of VSS especially on prices and market access. The chapter focuses on the Commission Guidance on Horizontal Agreements, under which standard-setting in line with procedural requirements is seen as pro-competitive. By employing empirical research on the market impact of VSS and economic literature, the chapter argues that VSS can result in restrictions to competition and it questions whether a hands-off competition treatment of VSS is warranted. This finding is assessed against the current approach for balancing pro- and anti-competitive effects of agreements as applied by the Commission. The chapter then suggests a possible approach under Art. 101 TFEU for a thorough scrutiny of economic and non-economic effects of VSS. Chapter 3 also studies VSS under rules for dominant undertakings and considers whether recognition of VSS at the national level would exclude the application of competition rules.