This chapter examines the legacy of Kuhn’s Structure for normative philosophy of science. It begins with an examination of Kuhn’s normative methodology and his position that historical cases provide evidence for philosophical claims. Kuhn’s philosophical methodology is insufficiently articulated, and his utilization of case studies is subject to objections implied by Pitt’s dilemma of case studies. The chapter subsequently examines the post-Kuhnian methodological positions of Ian Hacking, Helen Longino, Michael Friedman, and Hasok Chang. These views suggest alternative methodological strategies in the history and philosophy of science (HPS) tradition for addressing normative issues. It concludes by articulating some outstanding methodological challenges for the pluralist tradition of HPS ? associated with the Stanford and Minnesota schools of philosophy of science ? that emerged in the 1980s and remains influential.

Geology can be characterized as ‘earth history’. As such it relies on narrative forms in its explanations and interpretations. Unlike ‘mere’ stories, however, geological narratives are tightly constrained by physical laws, and they typically play an important role in geological reasoning. It is not uncommon for geological narratives to be rewritten when new evidence emerges or when theories change, as is illustrated here by the history of the changing interpretation of a particular stratigraphic layer in north-west Scotland, which had been regarded as unremarkable in the late nineteenth century. In the 1960s, it was re-evaluated as being the product of a violent volcanic eruption and was named the Stac Fada Member. A further reinterpretation in 2006 led to it being identified as the material ejected from a meteorite impact crater. This chapter examines the reasons behind the rewriting of these explanatory narratives and explores how narratives are used in geology.

After we have seen how the p-model works, this chapter evaluates the p-model’s methodology with respect to current tendencies in the history and philosophy of science.sketches four interrelated processes. First, the fall of the analytical philosophy of science was accompanied by the historical turn that yielded the emergence of the discipline ‘the history and philosophy of science’. Second, as opposed to the earlier programme of unified science, by now the philosophy of science has acknowledged the pluralism of scientific inquiry. Third, there is also a process that has led to the simultaneous presence of the general philosophy of science and the discipline-specific histories and philosophies of science. Finally, there is a pluralism of the specific histories and philosophies of science within the discipline as well. The p-model fits into these processes.reflects on the basic method applied by the history and philosophy of science, namely, case studies. It outlines the p-model’s answer to the question of why the results of single case studies may be generalised and how they can be selected without bias.is devoted to the question of whether our results can be applied to other fields of linguistic research than those mainstream grammatical approaches that the case studies have focused on.