According to the recognition heuristic (RH) theory, decisions follow the recognition principle: Given a high validity of the recognition cue, people should prefer recognized choice options compared to unrecognized ones. Assuming that the memory strength of choice options is strongly correlated with both the choice criterion and recognition judgments, the RH is a reasonable strategy that approximates optimal decisions with a minimum of cognitive effort (Davis-Stober, Dana, & Budescu, 2010). However, theories of recognition memory are not generally compatible with this assumption. For example, some threshold models of recognition presume that recognition judgments can arise from two types of cognitive states: (1) certainty states in which judgments are almost perfectly correlated with memory strength and (2) uncertainty states in which recognition judgments reflect guessing rather than differences in memory strength. We report an experiment designed to test the prediction that the RH applies to certainty states only. Our results show that memory states rather than recognition judgments affect use of recognition information in binary decisions.