This chapter compares the epistemological assumptions of late-antique Prolegomena to Philosophy with those of the Didaskaliai of Dorotheus of Gaza, a sixth-century ascetic teacher. It focuses on the epistemic role of godlikeness, the claim that the goal of philosophy, understood in terms of either Neoplatonism or the monastic life, is to become like God. In both Neoplatonism and in Dorotheus’ teaching, the concept of godlikeness orders knowledge and promotes ways of knowing developed in order to bridge the gap between the politico-ethical and the spiritual, the practical and the theoretical. Comparing Dorotheus’ teachings with the Introductions to Philosophy identifies substantial shared epistemic assumptions. A key difference between the schemes is generated by the epistemic role of humility in Dorotheus’ account.

This chapter addresses the relationship between divinity, cosmology, morality and religion in the Timaeus and the Laws. It argues that the ideal of godlikeness becomes both the main ethical and the central religious principle in these dialogues. In particular, Plato finds in religion the institutional environment for achieving moral improvement as much as leading a good civic life, provided that the ordinary citizens will imitate the character traits of the traditional gods. However, the highest level of moral achievement lies in the assimilation to the cosmic gods via cosmological understanding, which can be achieved by the intellectual elite. Thus, this ideal has two sets of assimilative objects, two ways of imitating the gods, and it appeals to two different groups of people.

This chapter examines the reception of Plato’s take on cosmology and religion in the works of the Early Academy. It argues that the Academics continued to develop the theology of Ouranos, who remained the primary cosmic god in their cosmological systems. They also moved towards a tighter union of the traditional and cosmic gods. Philip of Opus used the identities of the traditional gods to uncover the divinity in planets and stars, while Xenocrates extended the procedure of religious naming to all ontological and cosmological principles, thus fully assimilating the traditional gods with the philosophical gods. Finally, their moral systems adopted a strongly intellectualist version of the ideal of godlikeness, according to which only the cosmological beings can be the ethical role models.

This paper focuses on Porphyry’s account of the just treatment of non-human animals in his treatise On Abstinence from Killing Animals. In responding to the Stoic argument that justice extends only to rational beings and leaves out non-rational animals, Porphyry introduces a number of considerations to show that animals are not entirely deprived of reason. It is usually assumed that Porphyry thereby commits himself to the view that animals are rational, thus breaking from the tradition of treating rationality as distinctive of humans. This assumption has been recently challenged by G. Fay Edwards, who argues that Porphyry neither believes that animals are rational nor that justice extends only to rational beings, but that he is merely trying to trap the Stoics into admitting that animals are rational and for this reason recipients of justice. I will argue that Porphyry ascribes rationality to animals, although he does not think that this is the reason for treating them justly. Central to my interpretation is Porphyry’s claim that rationality admits of degrees, which allows him to ascribe to animals a certain level of rationality without compromising his Platonic ideals.