The theory of social choice is very rich in topics and issues that have been discussed since Kenneth Arrow’s seminal contribution in 1951. This keynote chapter is only able to deal with only a few of them. The start is Arrow’s impossibility theorem, two routes that escape from this negative result and the issue of whether there are some properties that should be satisfied by every aggregation rule in order to qualify as desirable. Next, the literature on individual liberty and rights is related to the notion of freedom in the sense of control over one’s functioning bundle. Then the procedural aspect of individual and collective choice, often mentioned but not worked out in detail, is discussed. Finally, a particular approach to measure and compare capability sets is proposed.

Educating responsible moral agents is a central goal of democratic societies committed to the values of justice, equality, and the promotion of individuals’ well-being. How best to pursue the goal through formal schooling is, however, highly debated in moral education, due to reasonable disagreement on values and how to impart them. This chapter suggests that the core concepts of the capability approach provide an ethical framework which can fruitfully inform moral education. The approach’s core idea of evaluating individual well-being and the justice of society in terms of capability, or the substantive freedom to choose one’s valued life, together with the concept of agency and the importance of rational deliberation, set the ethical foundations for educating morally responsible citizens, who consider and treat other people as moral equals, care for social justice, and value their own and others’ well-being.

There are two versions of the capability approach, one associated with the work of Amartya Sen and the other with that of Martha C. Nussbaum. The two versions differ substantially in their use of the central concepts and it is not exactly clear how they are related to each other. Drawing on game theory, this chapter presents a framework that synthesizes the two versions of the capability approach. It allows us to give a precise rendition of the contents and scope of capability and also enables us to make a careful distinction between different types of capabilities.

Empirical measures of gender inequality lag behind the more sophisticated conceptual discussion of gender in the capabilities approach. This is due to a range of conceptual and empirical challenges associated with measuring gender inequality in capabilities. They relate to the distinction between well-being and agency, possible gender differences in needs and preferences, as well as household-based instead of individual-based assessments of well-being. As a result, it is very difficult to empirically assess gender inequalities in capabilities with a sufficient amount of accuracy and reliability. In contrast, more progress can be made in documenting gender gaps in functionings. This can be done by using all available individual-level information in standard household surveys, extending these surveys to include more individual-level indicators, and by relying on custom-made data for more detailed assessments. At the same time, measured gender gaps in functionings are not easily interpreted. While in some cases, it is relatively easy to conclude that such gaps imply unequal treatment and discrimination, not all observed gaps can be interpreted in this way. We therefore need to be more circumspect when interpreting gender gaps in functionings, and particularly try to understand much better why these gender gaps exist and, in many cases, persist.

Two fundamental attributes of the capability approach are: (1) a broadening of the evaluation space from the instrumental means such as income to the intrinsic ends of beings and doings, or functionings; and (2) the further broadening of evaluation from achievement of ends to opportunity to achieve those ends — from functionings to capabilities. This chapter accepts the first broadening, but presents a critique of the opportunity perspective in capability theory, using as a platform a critique of recent work on inequality of opportunity. The chapter argues that similar critiques of concept and empirical application apply to capability analysis as an analysis and an evaluation of opportunity. Perhaps for this reason, much of the practical implementation of capability theory ends up by in fact focusing on outcomes in functionings space, with only a loose link to opportunity.