The chapter applies the theoretical resources discussed in the first two chapters to provide a first justification of the idea that internet access should be a human right. This justification is based on the claim that today internet access is practically indispensable for having adequate opportunities for the exercise and enjoyment of political human rights (e.g. the freedoms of expression, free assembly, and information) and civil human rights (e.g. right to life and security of person). Numerous practical examples such as the #MeToo and the Black Lives Matter movements, international political protests and boycotts, and open source intelligence crowdsourcing show that a person without internet access is unfairly limited in their chances to exercise these rights in digitalised societies. Rather, our human rights are greatly enhanced if a person can access the internet. Moreover, because the internet provides a modern, digital public sphere, not having online access is a form of political exclusion. The chapter also responds to the important objection that no new human right to internet access is needed because internet access is sufficiently protected by other human rights.

This chapter discusses the right to freedom of association and of assembly, as well as the right to demonstrate, as they are protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, other Council of Europe instruments, in EU law and in international instruments. Attention is also paid to trade union freedom and political parties. In the final section, a short comparison between the different instruments is made

This chapter introduces those rights and freedoms that are considered core to the democratic process. Those freedoms (often labelled ‘civil liberties’) ensure that individuals are able to circulate and obtain information freely, are able to participate in the election of representatives (and governments) and are able to peacefully – and collectively – make public demonstrations of political viewpoints without incurring criminal sanctions. In turn this chapter will therefore consider freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the liberty and security of the person, and the right to vote.

This chapter provides an account of the protection of civil liberties and human rights in English law. This includes an account of the Human Rights Act 1998 and its relationship to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. It also explains the interaction between the Human Rights Act 1998 and common law protections of fundamental rights. It then provides an evaluation of the laws on terrorism, freedom of expression and the right to protest.

After the surge of hate speech by far-right groups in the late 2000s, several such groups sought to use local public facilities to promulgate hate speech chiefly against Koreans resident in Japan. This led local governments to confront the difficult question of how to strike a balance between freedom of assembly (and expression), on the one hand, and the interests of minority residents, on the other. In this chapter, it is argued that local governments can sometimes refuse hate groups use of their facilities to protect local minority residents and that the guidelines issued by some local governments are constitutional despite some notable defects. Many constitutional law scholars in Japan will certainly oppose this conclusion, but this chapter contends that their position cannot be supported, because it overcategorizes conflicting interests and abstracts highly complex factors. It must be recognized that there are exceptions to free speech protections in relation to certain categories of hate speech. Some cases on the use of public facilities by hate groups constitute an example of such exceptions, because certain uses will clearly harm minority residents and thereby contravene the public purpose of establishment and operation of those facilities.