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After a constitutional amendment in 1992 ended one-party rule and introduced presidential term limits, Kenya had two full-blown constitution-making processes in relatively quick succession: the first ran from 2000 to 2005, ending when a draft constitution was rejected in a referendum; the second, from 2008 to 2010, “succeeded” in August 2010 when Kenya adopted a new constitution. The second process was designed with hindsight – the politicians who devised it consciously sought to avoid the problems that had beset its predecessor. The adoption of a new constitution in 2010 has not led to constitutional stability, however, and reform proposals continue to be debated. The chapter also reflects on the role of a foreign member of the Committee of Experts charged with the drafting of the initial text.
More than a half-century of isolation and ideological limits meant theoretical and practical knowledge of market economics was very limited. But the view exemplified by President Kravchuk of Ukraine that before reforms started one needed to train experts and managers was much overstated. In retrospect, it is clear that enough expertise was available to move forward, especially in Central Europe where many academics had exposure to Western economics. In the USSR, the numbers were indeed far lower, but these could be easily supplemented by foreign advisors –some diaspora returnees, others seconded from international organizations. Most important, the numbers of market experts needed was not large – a few ministerial and deputy ministerial positions, and heads of key departments numbered not in the thousands nor even hundreds. The best example of the limited need was the Baltics, which were among the fastest reformers with virtually no experts in market economics; a physicist Einars Repše, heading the Central Bank, was considered by international experts one of the most effective in the entire region. The chapter makes these arguments while providing an inside look at many key individuals involved, including Balcerowicz in Poland, Bokros of Hungary, Gaidar in Russia, and Pynzenyk in Ukraine.
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