How does the understanding of law among individuals involved in the crypto phenomenon originate, and how does it impact the trajectory of this innovation? This article examines the legal consciousness of crypto industry participants and state actors, exploring their ideologies on law, property and innovation through extensive document and archival research. It highlights the interplay between the crypto industry’s perception of crypto-assets’ possessing dynamic and self-regulating qualities beyond traditional legal boundaries and the increasing willingness of state actors, despite their reservations, to utilise law as a flexible tool to embrace innovation and promote economic competitiveness. By employing Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, this article contextualises such legal consciousness within the financial system and contends that collective legal consciousness and associated behavioural dynamics substantially shape state–industry interactions, with the potential to destabilise the financial system. This article sheds light on the challenges presented by crypto-assets and the intricate interplay between law and technological advancements.

Investment banks collaborated with health care entrepreneurs and managers in the 1990s to add a costly layer of investor-owned corporations to the US medical delivery system. In capitalizing and consolidating physician practices, publicly traded Physician Practice Management Companies (PPMCs) incorporated elements of the broader capitalist economy. Companies such as PhyCor, MedPartners, and FPA Medical Management turned to the equity and debt markets to generate shareholder profits and capital for acquisitions. Contemporary theories of financial economics reinforced their activities. PPMCs collapsed after shareholder lawsuits accused them of reporting false figures to the SEC and banks withdrew their credit. Physicians were both accomplices and victims in the process that made the medical delivery system less equitable, less effective, and more expensive. Although this experiment in medical capitalism failed, it widened the door for Wall Street to build new ways to profit from health care.

This article contributes an account of a key moment in the development of venture capital. I argue the US Small Business Administration’s Task Force on Venture and Equity Capital for Small Business, established in 1976 and headed by William J. Casey, had an outsized impact on the development of modern venture capital and its close associations with the high technology sector. The Task Force’s 1977 report was influential in establishing both the figure of the venture capitalist and the business model of institutionally supported, limited partnership venture capital in the minds of policymakers, businesspeople, and the general public. This article traces the influence of one part of the Report: a prominently featured schematic model, entitled “Life Cycle of a New Enterprise: Model of a Growing and Successful Company, 1975-1976 Financial Market Conditions.” I trace the influence of the LCM as it spread through the developing high technology sector, as shown by its appearances in business publications, governmental reports, and congressional testimonies offered by industry leaders. The LCM was genericized away from its original authors and intentions, becoming part of the economic imaginary of the technology and innovation sector.

This article proposes ethical — and legal — accountability for lawyers representing clients such as private equity (PE) firms who create ownership structures for nursing home systems. Using PE ownership as a case study, I will show that nursing home residents are often harmed and Medicaid costs inflated. I propose private law provides tools to compel such accountability, through (1) aiding and abetting doctrines and (2) fiduciary doctrines that require that the fiduciary be responsible for its vulnerable beneficiaries, not just ethically but for damages and equitable relief. I further propose that the teaching of Professional Responsibility needs to be changed to force law students to consider the effect of legal practice on third parties in situations like health care financing.

As the world comes together through the WHO design and consultation process on a new medical counter-measures platform, we propose an enhanced APT-A (Access to Pandemic Tools Accelerator) that builds on the previous architecture but includes two new pillars – one for economic assistance and another to combat structural inequalities for future pandemic preparedness and response. As part of the APT-A, and in light of the Independent Panel on Pandemic Preparation & Response's call for an enhanced end-to-end platform for access to essential health technologies, we propose a new mechanism that we call the Pandemic Open Technology Access Accelerator (POTAX) that can be implemented through the medical countermeasures platform and the pandemic accord currently under negotiation through the World Health Assembly and supported by the High-Level Meeting review on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response at the United Nations. This mechanism will provide (1) conditional financing for new vaccines and other essential health technologies requiring companies to vest licenses in POTAX and pool intellectual property and other data necessary to allow equitable access to the resulting technologies. It will also (2) support collective procurement as well as measures to ensure equitable distribution and uptake of these technologies.

Leon Wansleben’s new book, The Rise of Central Banks: State Power in Financial Capitalism, tells an intricately complex story of the world’s most influential central banks successfully harnessing the forces of financial globalization to build their institutional power as the principal managers of their national economies. The book argues that, regardless of central banks’ rationales and rationalizations, the resulting expansion of global money markets has failed to generate the intended macroeconomic and societal benefits. Instead, as became evident in the post-2008 era, the world’s most powerful central banks are now structurally dependent on the increasingly self-referential markets for financial assets. While the book’s narrative is focused on inflation targeting and other monetary policy innovations since the 1970s, it raises much broader questions and invites further reflection on the nonlinear dynamics of power in today’s financial markets and the uncertain future of central banks.

While FinTech gets promoted as an innovative and progressive solution to meeting financial needs globally, it is afflicted by pervasive gender inequalities, only recently noticed in research. To explore these gender inequalities at the core of FinTech, we use a mixed-methods approach, combining data on 100 leading FinTech firms and 15 interviews with FinTech professionals, collected in the latter half of 2021. We argue that women in FinTech face the ‘triple glass ceiling’ at the intersection of financial, technological, and entrepreneurial gender inequalities. Our sample shows that women account for only 7.69% of (co-)founders, 18.2% of executive committee members, and merely 4.04% of FinTech companies are led by a woman. Gendered stereotypes and a privileging of masculine performances produce significant barriers to women entering and progressing within FinTech. Discriminatory practices are overt and implicit, everyday and exceptional, micro and acute. Shattering the ‘triple glass ceiling’ in FinTech represents an immense challenge.

Why are international regulatory standards not set? While most of the literature focuses on explaining positive cases of standard-setting where international rules are agreed upon, weak or negative cases remain prevalent and yet surprisingly under-explored. To explain these cases in the area of financial services, we integrate an inter-state explanation, which focuses on competition between major jurisdictions, with a transgovernmental explanation, which relates to conflict between different regulatory bodies at the international level. We also consider how these dimensions interact with financial industry lobbying. This allows us to construct a typology differentiating between distinct types of cases concerning international standard-setting: (1) absent standards, (2) non-agreed standards, (3) symbolic standards, and (4) agreed standards. The explanatory leverage of our approach is illustrated through a systematic structured focused comparison of four post-crisis cases related to “shadow banking.” The article generates novel insights into regulatory conflicts and the scope conditions for international agreement.