In January 2021 the Human Rights Committee determined that Italy and Malta had both failed to protect the right to life of more than 200 migrants who perished in a shipwreck in 2013. The Committee tackled for the first time the question of extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to persons in distress at sea. While finding the decision against Malta to be inadmissible, the Committee engaged in a significant analysis of the concept of jurisdiction in both decisions. This article analyses how the decisions interpret the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ and juxtaposes this analysis against the approaches taken in other international legal regimes. The article then theorises on the impact of these two decisions in helping to crystallise a new ‘right to be rescued at sea’.

Traditionally, international human rights adjudication relied on the paradigm of extraterritoriality on the rare occasions when it was confronted with cross-border cases. This paradigm recognises only limited circumstances in which states bear extraterritorial human rights obligations. However, with globalisation, transboundary human rights cases have multiplied. This emerging litigation increasingly reveals that the paradigm of extraterritoriality is no longer fit to address global crises. Extraterritoriality demands effective control over a territory, or authority and control over a person, for a state to exercise jurisdiction outside its territory. Thus, several cases of cross-border human rights abuses are inevitably barred on jurisdictional grounds. This is particularly true for obligations of a global character, which are, by their very nature, completely unrelated to the control that states exercise over territories or people. It is therefore necessary to look beyond extraterritoriality. This article analyses the competing paradigms of universality and transnationality as they have been adopted by domestic courts. It argues that international human rights adjudication should reconceptualise extraterritoriality against the background of universality and transnationality to address global crises.

It is a huge pleasure to engage with Prof. Shaw’s careful and close reading of my article. Though almost a decade old, many of the issues are becoming only more relevant as it seems that Roe v Wade will be overruled in the U.S. and travel for abortion will become a sad reality.1 I appreciate how deeply Prof. Shaw interacts with my article and am full of praise for his work, but given the small space allocated here I only focus on our few places of disagreement.

Corporations are notoriously powerful actors in the current configuration of our globalized economy. Their activities play a key role in shaping a new age of ecological precarity—the Anthropocene. Much of this environmental damage occurs in cross-border settings, hampering victims’ access to legal remedies due to widespread corporate impunity and institutional hurdles in host states. Several transnational lawsuits have recently tested the willingness of European home state judiciaries to adjudicate the extraterritorial conduct of domestic corporations. To contribute to a more nuanced understanding of this novel phenomenon, this article analyzes three legal sagas from a comparative perspective: Vedanta v. Lungowe (England & Wales), Dooh v. Shell (The Netherlands) and Lliuya v. RWE (Germany). It argues that transnational tort suits remain a problematic vehicle for the attainment of procedural and substantial environmental justice. The inherent limitations of tort law, extra-legal hurdles to transnational litigation, and the socio-cultural contingency of legal institutions severely circumscribe the space for legal contestations of the corporate Anthropocene.

This essay seeks to consider Anna Stilz's Territorial Sovereignty: A Philosophical Exploration in light of settler and nonsettler colonialism and their contemporary legacies. In particular, it examines the intergenerational claims of Indigenous communities and the extraterritorial claims of colonial and neocolonial subjects. The broad aim of this effort is to consider how centering the imperial roots of our contemporary nation-state system transforms our understanding and justifications of territorial sovereignty.

When courts are faced with questions regarding the territorial scope of internal legislation, they are required to engage with controversial issues pertaining to the permissible boundaries of regulatory reach, which go beyond traditional conceptions of state sovereignty and non-intervention on which the functioning of courts is normally based. This Article examines the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) in reviewing the legality and interpretation of the extraterritorial reach of EU environmental law, including animal welfare. It assesses the extent to which judicial review by the CJEU serves as a transnational mechanism for addressing legitimacy concerns raised by the unilateral exercise of EU regulatory power beyond EU borders.

Research on comparative authoritarianism has tended to neglect spatial approaches to the politics of non-democratic states. This article argues that spatial theory offers a useful framework for exploring extraterritorial security practices designed to counter political opposition among migrant and exile communities. A case study of Uzbekistan explores how the state responded to the perceived security threats posed by rapidly growing communities of labor migrants and the activities of many political and religious activists in exile. The security services developed a network of extraterritorial intelligence and security mechanisms – including surveillance, detention, interrogation and forced returns – to pre-empt or respond to any perceived threats to the regime emanating from abroad. These security practices extended the state in complex ways beyond its borders, resulting in new “state spaces” that reproduced elements of domestic repression in other jurisdictions. The article suggests that such extraterritorial practices are typical of contemporary authoritarian regimes, as such states seek to manage the spatial challenges produced by mass global migration, international financial flows, and transnational processes of knowledge production.

The contribution argues that facticity of the human rights impacts of economic globalisation increasingly undermines the normativity of the state-centred conception of international human rights law. The exposure of the international legal order of states to the operations of global business entities leads to a collusion of sovereign state interest and globalised corporate power at the expense of protecting the rights of victims of human rights violations in the global market economy. The contribution scrutinises two prominent attempts to address this lacuna of protection: transnational tort litigation and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. It is argued that both approaches are not only an expression of the present crisis of international human rights law but also risk contributing to its perpetuation. While the ‘escape into tort’ results in the privatisation of public human rights in the global market economy, the UN Guiding Principles entrench their territorialisation in the state legal order in the face of global economic challenges. The concluding section reflects on the future pathways of international human rights law by positing a choice between, on the one hand, a more radical departure from human rights’ state-centred heritage and, on the other hand, a transformation of the international legal order of states by virtue of human rights. It highlights the importance of extraterritorial human rights obligations in recovering the state's legal accountability for human rights violations committed in the course of global business operations.

This article explores the compatibilities and tensions between the human right to education and occupation law. In 2004, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued an advisory opinion stating that Occupying Powers must extend their international human rights treaty obligations to the people in the territories they occupy. This finding reaffirmed what many human rights and occupation law scholars and judicial and quasi-judicial bodies have long claimed. While occupation law and human rights law are largely compatible tensions between the two can arise however. This is not surprising given the basic premises that each body of law is based upon. While occupation law largely works to restrict the occupant from tampering with the laws and institutions of the occupied territory, there are significant portions of human rights law that work hard to press states to amend or change laws and develop infrastructure to accommodate the welfare of their populations. This tension is not merely theoretical. It has been the case since at least World War I that occupants have taken an interest in making changes to the education of youth and educational institutions in the territory they control. Relying primarily on the core obligations of the right to education, this study looks at the extraterritorial and positive human rights obligations that occupants have with regard to the primary education of children inside an occupied territory. It also sets out an approach that helps mediate the areas where the two are less than compatible.