This chapter describes the first week of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the immediate sanctions and export control measures that followed. While focusing on the U.S. response, it describes key steps taken by the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Australia, and others. The chapter links developments in the ground war to the key economic responses by the forces aligned against Russia. As the extent of the Russian invasion became clear, sanctions were announced and subsequently ratcheted up extremely rapidly. The chapter also highlights the extraordinarily coordinated nature of the sanctions response.

By the end of 2022, the sanctions were voluminous. But the economic and other measures deployed against Russia were not as comprehensive as other sanctions regimes had been. Technically, the sanctions remained targeted. There was no comprehensive trade embargo, for example, against Russia by the United States or the European Union. Regulated parties, however, tended toward overcompliance; companies also ceased to do business with Russia for reputational reasons. These trends meant that the implementation of targeted sanctions often resembled comprehensive ones in practice. But the Russia sanctions were not so sweeping as those imposed upon Cuba, Iran, North Korea, or Syria, for instance.

This chapter focuses in particular on import restrictions and export controls as weapons of economic warfare as used against Russia, as opposed to the sanctions measures that are the focus of much of the book. These tools supplement the sanctions measures and help promote the same foreign policy ends through alternative means. For example, the chapter examines changes to Russia’s “most favored nation” status, and the resulting effect on imports into the U.S. from Russia. Import bans were also implemented on many items from Russia in multiple jurisdictions. Export controls of high-tech items are also discussed.

This chapter considers the impact of the sanctions in the short-term: both the economic impact on the Russian state and the Russian people, as well as sanctions’ failure to prevent further military action by Russia in Ukraine. Unintended knock-on or ripple effects of the sanctions are also discussed, as are the effects of the sanctions on world trading patterns and the economic health of other nations. The chapter also considers the potential long-term effects of sanctions on the Russian economy.

The US-China trade war and looming ‘technological de-coupling’ instigated major revisions of Chinese laws and regulations. These recent amendments represent a major shift in the role assigned to export restrictions. In particular, China is more willing than before to use export restrictions as a geopolitical tool. To test the veracity of this assertion, this chapter analyses China’s use of export restrictions in the period from 2001 to 2021. It suggests that three distinct phases can be discerned: (i) the elimination of export restrictions before and after joining the WTO; (ii) the selective use of export restrictions for domestic policy reasons; and (iii) a shift toward strategic use of export restrictions as an instrument of geopolitical competition. Several implications flow from this new development: it endangers existing supply chains, may bifurcate the global economy by sapping its growth potential and contributes to the erosion of the multilateral trading system.

Chapter 4 examines international attempts to regulate the acquisition of weapons by those at war. The chapter examines the development of export controls, the disarmament regime, and Security Council arms embargoes as part of the normative background to the Arms Trade Treaty (2014).