In this chapter, I begin with the observation that there is an asymmetry in our normative expectations of degrees of self-blame and degrees of other-blame. There are many situations in which it seems intuitively plausible that a person should blame herself to a certain degree, while at the same time it is also appropriate for others to blame her to a lesser degree. This calls out for explanation. In this chapter, I canvass the prospects for rejecting the idea that there is any systematic explanation to be found, as well as those of a variety of possible explanations that purport to justify a genuine asymmetry between the norms of self-blame and other-blame. These latter include explanations according to which it is virtue to over-blame in one’s own case, and in which it is a virtue to be disposed to under-blame in the case of others. In the end, I argue instead that a central and systematic explanation relies in part on a general moral principle that asymmetric risk imposition between self and others is justified. I conclude by exploring the implications of this view for whether we should privilege intuitions about self-blame, other-blame, or neither when engaged in philosophical theorizing.

There are better and worse ways to blame others. Likewise, there are better and worse ways to blame yourself. And though there is an ever-expanding literature on the norms that govern our blaming practices, relatively little attention has been paid to the norms that govern expressions of self-blame. In this chapter, I argue that when we blame ourselves, we ought not do so privately. Rather, we should, ceteris paribus, express our self-blame to those we have wronged. I then explore how this norm can contribute to our understanding of the ethics of self-blame as well as the nature of blameworthiness itself.