This chapter explores the ideational function of emoji as they concur with language to construe experience as items and activities in social media posts. The chapter details a system network for modelling ideational concurrence. This network defines two main kinds of relations: depiction and embellishment. Depiction is where emoji congruently illustrate their co-text or integrate themselves into the ideational structure of the post. Embellishment, on the other hand, is where emoji make less congruent meanings by either metaphorising through figurative meanings or emblematising through symbols that activate preconfigured meanings for particular communities. The chapter draws on the discourse semantic system of ideation introduced in Chapter 3 to understand the concurrence of emoji and linguistic sequences, figures, and elements.

Chapter 4 turns to an elucidation of a plaintiffs pleading burden in alledging a public nuisance claim. In modern 20th century jurisprudence, as defined by the ALI Restatement (Second) of Torts, a public nuisance claim involves four elements that a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendants affirmative conduct (2) caused an unreasonabel interference (3) with a right common to the general public (4) this is abatable. The ALI Restatement (Second) public nuisance elements are derived from the common law extant at the time of drafting the restatement. Many states have codified these elements, or similar elements, in thier general public nuisance statutes. This chpater examines the competing ways in which courts have interprtede these elemts, particularly what constitutes a commonly held publci rigt. Courts also have diagreed concerning what constitutes an unreasonable interference with a public right. The chapter concludes with an exploration of of the judicial trend towards greater flexibility in defining public nusiance more expansively than the common law doctrine and statutory interpretations.

In On the Nature of the Human Being, Polybus claims that the humors, like everything else, are composed of four substances: the hot, the cold, the dry, and the wet. He also discusses humoral flux – the idea that a single humor, after gathering in one part of the body, can create a wide range of effects by flowing to different parts. This chapter argues that Polybus’s thinking about cosmological principles is closely tied to his interest in humoral flux. Both concepts are motivated by an interest in tracing diseases to their “source” (arche), and both ultimately establish a two-pronged approach to treatment, wherein doctors are expected to target both the proximate cause of a disease (i.e., a concentrated humor) and its remote cause (i.e., the factor(s) that initially caused that humor to separate out). This chapter further argues that an interest in individual differences does not preclude a coexisting interest in cosmological principles. Instead, Polybus presents his cosmological principles as a solution to the problem of individual variation, identifying the shared “nature” (phusis) of human beings as a high-level commonality that transcends individual differences.

The treatise On Generation and Corruption (GC) consists of a general account of generation and corruption (offered in the first book) plus an elemental theory (advanced in the second book). This introduction explores the relation between these two pieces. The upshot of this exploration is that the unity of the treatise is stronger than it is often thought. Far from being a suboptimal amalgam of various pieces, the treatise is the best and most efficient way to fulfill the promise made at the outset, where an account of the nature and causes of generation and corruption is announced, including how they differ from other natural processes such as alteration and growth.

In GC II 5, Aristotle proceeds through a long and complicated argument against the view that there is a single primary body, concluding that a single simple body cannot function as the matter or origin of the other simple bodies. In doing so, he responds to a possible objection to his own account, defended in GC II 4, and confirms that each of the simple bodies is an origin for each of the others. This essay brings attention to the role of contrarieties in Aristotle’s refutation of theories that maintain a single primary body, either as the matter or the material origin of other simple bodies: given the role of contrarieties in explaining simple bodies, Aristotle finds that a single primary body is incompatible with the existence of change. By highlighting the role of contrarieties in explaining change, Aristotle leaves room for the primary contraries to function as a kind of matter, although the details of his account are not explored in GC II 5.

After arguing that each of the elements can come to be out of each of the three others, the bulk of GC II 4 presents and compares the speed and ease of three mechanisms by which the elements change into one another. While scholars have thought these three mechanisms are narrowly focused on individual changes, i.e., the three ways an element can change into each of the others, on my interpretation, the three mechanisms describe every possible complete cycle by which all four elements come to be, either singly or pairwise. Thus, I understand Aristotle’s interest in speed and ease as an interest in which mechanism generates all four elements most quickly and easily. My interpretation shows Aristotle builds on passages other scholars and translators have deemed textual oddities or mistakes and has the additional advantage of showing that Aristotle’s interest in the relative speed and ease of cycles of elemental transformation lays the groundwork for his metaphysical and scientific projects in GC II 10 and the Meteorology.

Aristotle’s longest and most comprehensive critical discussion of Empedocles’ natural philosophy occurs in GC II 6. He structures his criticism around four Empedoclean theses. (1) There are four kinds of elemental body and instances of these kinds do not change into one another. (2) Everything that comes to be by nature does so by chance. (3) Love and strife are the principles of natural bodily movement. (4) Soul is, or is constituted by, one or more of the four elemental bodies. I discuss Aristotle’s arguments against each of these theses in detail. Though Aristotle’s arguments are predominantly negative, we can view them as collectively constituting a sustained defense of the superiority of his preferred account. Aristotle’s natural philosophy centers on his novel understanding of nature as an internal principle and cause of movement and rest. I argue that the phenomena Empedocles is unable to explain adequately or endorse consistently are precisely the phenomena that Aristotle’s conception of nature is well-suited to explain.

GC II 7 supports Aristotle’s elemental theory, according to which the four elements possess a common matter that enables their inter-transformation, over the superficially similar Empedoclean one, by arguing that the former theory, and it alone, can accommodate the formation of homogenous stuffs like flesh and bone from the four elements. According to the interpretation offered here, these stuffs are mixtures in the sense spelled out in GC II 10, and appear to be exhibit the kind of strong uniformity that some interpreters have denied to Aristotelian mixtures. Special attention is devoted to bringing out the significance of elemental mixture for Aristotle’s twin projects in GC: understanding the causes of generation and destruction and establishing a theory of the elements. Explaining the formation of elemental mixtures is a crucial step in showing how the generation of more complex substances is possible and how the four elements, as he conceives them, function as elements of more complex substances.

This essay provides an analysis of GC I and explains why we now need to investigate the “so-called elements” – the primary bodies that make up all the more complex bodies of the sublunary world. This is an important passage for understanding how the discussion of the elements fits into the overall program of the whole work. In the second section, Aristotle broaches the question of whether there is a kind of matter “beyond” these elements. He criticizes two earlier theories which (he thinks) give an affirmative answer to this question: Anaximander’s theory of the apeiron and Plato’s theory of the Receptacle in the Timaeus. In the final section, Aristotle sets out his own position. This section is evidence that he was committed to prime matter – an ultimate material substratum which partially constitutes each of the primary sublunary bodies, and which underlies the process of elemental inter-transformation.

The relationship between Book I of Aristotle’s De Generatione et Corruptione to the rest of his writings on the physical world has been found puzzling. Aristotle’s first statement of its scope promises an account of very general principles of explanation. But the actual focus seems very restricted: theory of elements and of homoeomerous mixture. This study proceeds by examination of cross-references to and from other Aristotelian treatises. These reveal the reading order – the order of argument and exposition – that Aristotle intended for them. GC I presupposes readers already familiar with the cosmology and conceptual system expounded in the Physics, while in the other physical treatises the basic ideas of GC 1 are adapted and refined in explanations of more complex physical entities. GC 1 in fact provides three kinds of foundation: physical, conceptual, and teleological. The order Aristotle insists upon is directed towards a definite goal, the understanding of life and living things. It is not merely pedagogical. More likely it reflects a cosmic scale of values which grades living things as better than non-living, and knowledge of better things as a finer, more valuable kind of knowledge.

Basic nuclear physics related to element origins, elemental and isotope chemistry

Unitization agreements have several common components and principles that enable them to effectively govern collective resources. These agreements represent a governance system with several phases of development. Several key components work to separate the rights to extract from the right to a benefit, protecting private rights yet enabling collective governance. Private interests are protected as equity shares in the unitization agreement. A unit operator makes resource management decisions for the collectively held resource. As more information is gathered about resource conditions, private interests, represented as shares, are redetermined regularly to ensure accuracy and improve resource management over time. Thus, the methods of determining private shares in the unitization agreement are critical to the unit’s success.

This chapter explores assumptions about what things are made of (physicality) as revealed by ethnography and the study of antiquity. The history of Greek speculations on the problem reveals a striking diversity, where Aristotle’s ontology based on the primacy of substances was certainly not universally accepted by other theorists. A very different view on the question is common among ancient Chinese writers, who usually focussed not on stable substances but on interacting processes. This allows us to qualify some of the conclusions proposed by the anthropologist Descola in his account of the contrast between naturalism and animism.

Focusing on Seamus Heaney: Listen Now Again, a National Library of Ireland exhibition running for the next 3-5 years at the Bank of Ireland, College Green, Dublin, this chapter examines the process of curating and exhibiting Heaney’s archive. In exploring the transition from the private space of the writer’s room to the public place of the exhibition, the chapter probes the relationship between texts, contexts and objects in Heaney’s work. The chapter follows the trajectory of the exhibition from the earth-bound bog poems of Heaney’s early career to the airy transcendence of crediting marvels in his later work. It considers the aura of objects as well as the transformative relationship between Heaney’s creative inspiration, his writing process, the poetry and its referents.

I analyse the relation of two important doctrines of Ernst Mach’s epistemology – namely the theory of the elements, exposed in The Analysis of Sensations, and the economy of thought, mainly explored in Knowledge and Error and elsewhere – to his historical-critical approach. After discussing Erwin Hiebert’s seminal work on Mach’s philosophical use of the history of science, I defend the thesis that there is a more profound, structural relationship between Mach’s conception of history and the anti-metaphysical remarks which open The Analysis of Sensations and introduce his theory of the elements. Finally, I contend that this can provide novel insights into the doctrine of the economy of thought.

This part of Chapter 2 offers two definitions of ‘cosmos’ and then describes the latter as a whole containing the largest stable structures composed of the five elements: aether, fire, air, water and earth. It explains the division of the cosmos into the upper or supralunary part, which is made of aether and where things are incorruptible and in regular circular motion, and the lower or sublunary part, where things are diverse and less regular, composed of the remaining four elements, and subject to constant generation and corruption. The perfect supralunary part forms a system of concentric rotating spheres. While the fixed stars all move ‘on one visible surface of the whole of the heavens’, where they keep their position, the planets are simply said to each move in their own orbit, with no explicit mention of the higher number of moving spheres posited by Eudoxus or Callippus. Below the lowest planetary sphere, that of the Moon, the sublunary part of the cosmos begins. It is also organised in concentric spheres, each one dominated by one of the four elements, starting with fire and ending with earth in the immobile centre of the universe. The author pays special attention to the immutable aether that belongs to the causal chain extending from God to all the motions in the earthly region of the universe. In virtue of its physical perfection, the ether is indispensable for God’s guidance and administration of all heaven and Earth.

Johansen examines the role of internal heat in the theories of nutrition and animal generation in Plato’s Timaeus. There, Plato does not ascribe the status of being besouled to all beings which engage in nutrition, but to beings with perceptive faculties. This raises questions as to the status of nutrition in the explanation of life and besouled beings.