This chapter addresses the tensions between the high level of independence granted to the European Central Bank (ECB) under the Treaties and its accountability. In a first step, it sets out the legal framework of monetary policy within the system of the European System of Central Banks and explains in more detail the quantitative easing programmes of the ECB. It goes on to provide a summary of the back-and-forth litigation on the scope of monetary policy between the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Gauweiler and Weiss. Next, the chapter focuses on the judicial review of the monetary policy decisions by the Court of Justice and the national courts. Both these sections follow the same structure: first, they analyse access to courts and remedies; and second, they show how the courts under analysis approached the principles of equality and solidarity, for the purposes of achieving the common interest. The chapter closes with an examination of judicial interactions between EU and national courts and the role these play in the legal accountability of the ECB.

This chapter first introduces the main debates on the legitimacy of judicial review. It then turns to the most problematic examples of non-accountable decision-making that recently took place in the EMU, causing problems for individuals accessing fora of legal accountability, most visibly in the reduction of the protection of fundamental rights. The purpose of this exercise is to offer a sneak-peek preview of what went wrong, how (the lack of) judicial review contributed to this problem, and why traditional arguments against judicial review do not work in this context. Given that the EMU is an area characterised by high redistributive effects coupled with a wide discretion on the part of decision-makers, courts are in the perfect position to ensure that such decisions meet the Treaty objectives of the common interest. Any review of decisions in the EMU entails two duties. First, the starting point for courts must be an assumption of a full review. Second, decision-makers have an extensive duty of giving reasons for their decisions and put to the court the arguments on the nature of their discretion and how they used it. The chapter closes with conclusions on how the proposed framework will be used in the book.