The first question to be asked is whether the division of rights into absolute and relative is retained in the digital domain. A positive reply shows an image where the basic human rights architecture has no variance, and such variance can appear in the scope of these two areas; in other words, whether the circle of absolute rights online is substantially wider or narrower than offline. This means that the notions of dignity, personal freedom and equality appear online undistorted in comparison with the offline domain. Yet doubts can be raised due to the relativisation of the core values thesis. There does not appear any non-coherence between the idea of dignity in online and offline spaces due to the absence of abstract definitions. Both domains rely on an intuitionistic justification of dignity. There may occur non-coherence regarding the absolute nature of dignity since the offline rights environment is multilayered, but it is not certain that the online environment is.

This monograph is about the change in meaning and scope of human rights rules, principles, ideas and concepts, and the interrelationships and related actors, on moving from the physical domain into the online domain. The transposition into the digital reality can alter the meaning of well-established offline human rights to a wider or narrower extent; it can turn positivity into negativity and vice versa. The digital human rights realm has different layers of complexity in comparison with the offline realm.