When do smaller states defer to and when do they defy stronger powers? How and why? This article traces and explains the changing patterns of deference and defiance in Malaysia's China policy. There are three findings. First, deference and defiance are essential elements in all inter-state relations, especially asymmetric ones. The greater the power asymmetry, the greater the inclination to defer and defy. Second, states often pursue defiance and deference concurrently and selectively, with approaches adapted in accordance with changing external and internal conditions. The concurrent adoption of the two behaviors often manifest in hedging, an insurance-seeking policy aimed at offsetting multiple risks by counteracting the effects of the other behavior: deference without defiance risks subservience and dependency; defiance without deference invites hostility and confrontation. Third, the specific patterns and proportions of the deference–defiance mix are attributable more to domestic than external determinants, i.e., the needs to balance security, prosperity, and autonomy, as necessitated by the prevailing pathways of elite legitimation. This explains why Malaysia's open deference vis-à-vis China has been accompanied by an indirect and quiet defiance especially in recent years, as best evidenced by the second Mahathir administration's dualistic approaches toward the Belt and Road, South China Sea, and Xinjiang.

Concerns over food safety in China not only direct public attention to negative incidents, but also trigger the government's scrutiny of implicated firms, particularly MNCs. The question of how to repair legitimacy after media coverage of negative incidents has become a critical issue for MNCs. Although the factors for MNCs’ public crises have been identified, how local contexts and mechanisms shape repair approaches remain unclear. To address this research gap, we conducted a study of Walmart China's approaches associated with two negative incidents across two regions. We found that the negative incidents can be framed differently depending on the local environment's unfavorability for MNCs. Specifically, the negative framing gave rise to varying degrees of legitimacy loss and offered different leeway for MNCs to repair their legitimacy. We also identified the varied outcomes of different repair approaches. By revealing the linkages among local context, framing, legitimacy repair, and its outcomes, our study contributes to research on MNCs’ legitimacy management under institutional complexity and underscores the China context for legitimacy maintenance. We also offer insights that advance the institutional approach to legitimacy repair in this context. Last, we reflect on the techniques for conducting qualitative research in China.

In deciding whether to rule against a state party, international courts regularly confront a compliance dilemma: declare the state in breach of the international regime but with the risk that it will defy the court’s authority; or defer to the state but at the price of acquiescing to an unjust or undesirable outcome. Specifically, international adjudicators must solve this dilemma in a context of uncertainty, that is, without knowing with exactitude whether or not the state will prefer complying with an adverse ruling over overt defiance. I use a simple strategic model to cast light on this aspect of the compliance dilemma. Building off from the model’s insights, I then discuss the practices, doctrinal tactics and institutional mechanisms apt to reduce uncertainty and minimize state defiance. I highlight, in particular, the advantages of defiance avoidance mechanisms that help create informational feedback loops like test-the-water dicta and double-tier review. I illustrate how these mechanisms have been deployed by two of the world’s most powerful international courts, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, I consider the limitations of these mechanisms along with the possibility for other international dispute settlement bodies to replicate them.