We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The autonomy inherent in AI systems brings legal challenges. The reason is that it is no longer possible to predict whether and how explanations and actions emanating from AI systems originate and whether they are attributable to the AI system or its operator. The core research is whether the operator of AI systems is contractually liable for the damage caused by its malfunctioning. Is contract law sufficiently prepared for the use of AI systems for contract performance? The answer is provided through a review of the common law, CISG and the German Civil Code (BGB).
This chapter summarises the customary rules pertaining to the right to life. They bind not only States but also international organisations and, with respect to specific rules in certain circumstances, also non-State actors. The chapter further identifies those rules of general international law that have attained the status of peremptory norms (jus cogens) on the basis of their acceptance and recognition as such by the international community of States as a whole. Such norms bind all actors, whether State or non-State in character. Finally, the chapter delineates those rules that are custom in the making – de lege ferenda – but which have not yet crystallised, for want of opinio juris that is both general among States and specific among those States that are specially affected by it.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.