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Summary

This chapter examines the passage of power from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin. It shows at least four things. First, that Jiang did not consolidate power until he had been in office for approximately five years. Second, the purge of the military leadership allowed Jiang to build support in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Third, Jiang was able to move supporters into critical positions and thus consolidate power, and, fourth, he was able to extend his influence even after he stepped down. Together, these phases in the consolidation of power show how difficult it is to pass on power in a Leninist system, that control of the military remains a critical part of consolidating power, and that personal networks remain critical to understanding how power works in a Leninist system.

Understanding Chinese politics has become more important than ever. Some argue that China's political system is 'institutionalized' or that 'win all/lose all' struggles are a thing of the past, but, Joseph Fewsmith argues, as in all Leninist systems, political power is difficult to pass on from one leader to the next. Indeed, each new leader must deploy whatever resources he has to gain control over critical positions and thus consolidate power. Fewsmith traces four decades of elite politics from Deng to Xi, showing how each leader has built power (or not). He shows how the structure of politics in China has set the stage for intense and sometimes violent intra-elite struggles, shaping a hierarchy in which one person tends to dominate, and, ironically, providing for periods of stability between intervals of contention.

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2 - Succession and the Art of Consolidating Power

Summary

Rethinking Chinese Politics

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2 results

2 - Succession and the Art of Consolidating Power

Summary

Rethinking Chinese Politics