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2 results

  • What Sort of Imagining Might Remembering Be?

  • PETER LANGLAND-HASSAN
  • Journal:
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association / Volume 7 / Issue 2 / Summer 2021
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    23 April 2021, pp. 231-251

  • This essay unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the philosophy of memory over whether episodic remembering is simply a kind of imagining. So far, this debate has been hampered by a lack of clarity in the notion of imagining at issue. Several options are considered and constructive imagining is identified as the relevant kind. Next, a functionalist account of episodic remembering is defended as a means to establishing two key points: first, one need not defend a factive (or causalist) view of remembering in order to hold that causal connections to past experiences are essential to how rememberings are typed; and, second, current theories that equate remembering with imagining are in fact consistent with a functionalist theory that includes causal connections in its account of what it is to remember. This suggests that remembering is not a kind of imagining and clarifies what it would take to establish the contrary.

  • 19 - Continuities and Discontinuities Between Imagination and Memory: The View from Philosophy

  • from Part III - Intentionality-Based Forms of the Imagination
  • Edited by Anna Abraham, University of Georgia
  • Book:
    The Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination
    Published online:
    26 May 2020
    Print publication:
    18 June 2020, pp 293-310

  • Summary

    Though imagination and memory have much in common, philosophers of memory have so far had little to say about imagination. This has recently begun to change, as research on episodic memory as a form of imaginative mental time travel analogous to episodic future thought has threatened to undermine the view – standard in the philosophy of memory – that memory is sharply distinct from imagination. Covering a cluster of interrelated issues (including the objects of mental time travel, the reference of episodic thought, the epistemic openness of the future, the directness of our knowledge of the past, and immunity to error through misidentification in episodic memory and episodic future thought), this chapter surveys the debate between discontinuists, who argue that episodic remembering and episodic future thinking are processes of fundamentally different kinds, and continuists, who argue that the fact that they have distinct temporal orientations constitutes the only important difference between them – and hence that episodic memory is ultimately just a kind of episodic imagination.