[6.1] Statutory interpretation is to be ‘text-based’. ‘The text’ here refers to the words whose meaning or effect is in issue. Rooted in constitutional principles, consideration of the text is the starting point of the interpretative process. The text supplies the basis for ascertaining the ordinary or grammatical meaning and similar meanings. In turn, that supplies a presumptive and weighty meaning. After having been read in context, the text is also the ending point of the interpretative process. It is where meaning is ultimately held to ‘reside’. But, for an interpreter, the text is not limiting in the sense that he or she must choose between its grammatical or semantic possibilities, read in isolation. The paramount object remains to give effect to the intention of Parliament.

This chapter begins from the proposition that the conventional narrative suggests that there are unwritten constitutional rules and principles that exist adjacent to, or supplementary to, the official written constitution. But the spatial metaphor suggested by this framing of the issue is mistaken, the author says. He notes that we have learned from the enduring jurisprudential contributions of Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart that the status as law of a constitution rests on a necessarily unwritten social practice establishing what counts as the constitution. This unwritten social practice might exclude some of what the official written document includes and might include some rules or principles that are not found in the official written document, but the basic point is that a written document’s status as “the constitution” rests itself on unwritten foundations, making the idea of an unwritten constitution central to the very idea of constitutionalism.

The chapter describes and analyses the principles of European Macroeconomic Constitution and how it guides the ECB and EU in its macroeconomic governance. The principles can be divided into objectives and safeguards. The main objective of the economic constitution, integration through internal market, continues but gets price stability as the main macroeconomic objective, and to an extent a more elaborated open market economy principle to guide EU institutions. The safeguards start from central bank independence that are further defined by the prohibition of central bank financing and a narrow central banking model without explicit value judgments. Member States remain responsible for the other areas of economic policy with the obligation of sound fiscal policy. The principles form a logical whole and complement the earlier microeconomic constitution. However, the assumptions and theory backgrounds of the two constitutions differ substantially, which has many implications, including for the role of law and courts as well as independent experts, such as the ECB. These implications have even become apparent already in the earlier case law by the CJEU.

The chapter analyses the fate of the constitutional principles of the European Macroeconomic Constitution after the recurring crises. The measures by the ECB stretched the principles to the limits and beyond. The objectives of internal market and price stability fared relatively well, but the principle of open market economy less so. However, the institutional choices and safeguards were all seriously altered, where the prohibition of central bank financing and Member States responsibility for sound fiscal policy were among the key principles that were the most fundamentally transformed. This, apart from the concerns about the constitutionality of individual measures, raises fundamental questions about the European Macroeconomic Constitution. The accountability and even legitimacy of the ECB relied on its unique position as a central bank of an economic constitution. It empowered it, gave it independence, but also constrained and controlled it. The chapter argues that the preconditions for an independent expert role of the ECB have been challenged by its measures and the inability of the judicial review to sustain sufficient boundaries. Consequently, the accountability and legitimacy of the ECB have been compromised, and with that also the rule of law with regard to the EMU is under threat.