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Chapter 3 analyzes military intervention into Africa by former colonial powers and the European Union. It shows that their supportive and neutral interventions have been much more frequent than hostile interventions. Among these powers, France has remained the most interventionist state in Africa because close ties with Francophone governments have helped to provide successive French leaders with a global status and a mission beyond Europe. Consistent with quantitative and historical treatments, qualitative comparative analysis emphasizes the impact that capabilities and national roles have had on interventions by former colonial metropoles in Africa, while the European Union has intervened into Africa for humanitarian motives. Chapter 3 also demonstrates that supportive and neutral military interventions by former colonial powers into Africa correspond with high levels of mass unrest at home. As a result, this chapter contends that many French and other colonial military interventions failed to produce stability in African polities in part because the military actions were motivated by domestic concerns. Thus, some combination of national role, capabilities, and domestic political pressures help to explain many military interventions by former colonial powers, and none of these conditions seem likely to result in operations that put African populations’ interests at the forefront.
The decolonization, a process that leads to the nominal independence and international recognition of states, gained momentum in the late-1950s, having its peak in 1960, the African year, when 18 colonies, protectorates, and trust territories became independent. This chapter explores the decolonization of Africa from three perspectives: of the colonial powers, of the colonial states, i.e. the colonies themselves, and of the international system. It argues that there is not one explanation to capture the decolonization. Only if we scrutinize decolonisation from all three perspectives, we are able to comprehend that process in its complexity.
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