Charities increasingly make up the body politic of the Church of England. They include parochial church councils, diocesan boards of finance and national institutions. By April 2024 every chapter of a cathedral will be required to register as a charity. Faithful parishioners put their collection money in gummed envelopes which call for them to add Gift Aid to their donations. Individual churches run foodbanks, drop-in centres, baby and toddler groups, and a whole range of charitable activities. The general public could be forgiven for thinking that ‘the Church of England’ is a national charity. However, it has not always been the case that the work and mission of the Church of England has been through charities, and for much of its history the Church has remained largely independent of charity law. What are the consequences of increasing reliance on charities and where do the boundaries lie between ecclesiastical and canon law on the one hand and charity law on the other?

Most universities (bar profit-making institutions) are charities as a matter of law but, historically, have been exempt from charity law regulation. This paper considers the statutory reforms of 2006, which sought to level the regulatory playing field by appointing ‘Principal Regulators’ of such ‘exempt charities’ to promote compliance with charity law. Focusing on the university sector – where some universities are now registered charities (and regulated by the Charity Commission) whilst others remain exempt – it will note how the reforms have resulted in the application of significantly different degrees of scrutiny and accountability, both between individual universities and between universities and other charities. In part, this is due to the statutory framework itself but, significantly, is also attributable to the radically different approach taken by the Office for Students, which replaced HEFCE as Principal Regulator in 2018. Possible improvements in regulatory practice and statutory reform are offered.

Since 2001, a number of common law jurisdictions have initiated reforms to their charity law and the United Kingdom has taken the lead. This article examines what Hong Kong and Australia can learn from the United Kingdom in reforming their own outdated and fragmented charity laws. It is contended that the lessons and experiences of the United Kingdom provide good insights for Hong Kong and Australia as each jurisdiction anticipates implementing a broadly similar regime to the United Kingdom's to modernize regulation of their charity sectors. This article contends that there is no need to make a choice between retaining judicial decision-making over charities (inconsistent as it is) and establishing a type of charity commission which makes determining charitable status akin to a decision of a government department. Instead, Hong Kong and Australia can have charity commissions with missions that are sensitive to their own legal terrains but which are subject to judicial review.

This article considers the treatment of religious purposes in charity law from a liberal perspective informed by the work of the political philosopher Joseph Raz. The article begins by describing briefly the main ideas in Razian liberalism. It then considers the key question when thinking from a Razian perspective about the treatment of religious purposes in charity law: To what extent does the state's promotion of religious purposes via charity law promote the conditions of autonomy? Finally, the article considers the practical reasoning of state officials who deliberate about religious purposes in the charity law setting, asking to what extent such reasoning meets an ideal of public reason informed by Razian liberalism. The article concludes that in many, but not all, respects the treatment of religious purposes in charity law is consistent with Razian liberal commitments.