This Chapter is concerned with axioms and concepts of dialogical epistemology derived from the Ego-Alter interdependence. This interdependence is always about something, i.e. about objects or events, or about reflections on the Self’s and the Other(s)’ thoughts, imaginations and actions. I have referred to triangular relations between the Ego-Alter-Object in two ways. First, following Serge Moscovici’s ideas, there is a triangular relation between the Ego-Alter-Object of knowledge. Second, following the ideas of the anthropologist Louis Dumont, I have introduced the consumerist triadic relation the Ego-Alter-Thing of desire. Ethics in these two kinds of triangle follows different routes. In the former case, ethical relations between the Ego-Alter stem directly from intersubjectivity and the search for social recognition as the primary ontological relations. In the latter case, the ethical relations between the Ego-Alter are masked by the apparent priority given to the relation between the Self and the Thing of desire. In this case, the Ego’s search for social recognition, which superficially appears as craving for the Thing of desire, is in fact the desire for the desire of the Other’s desire. In other words, obtaining Objects of Others provides the Self with a social status and thus, with illusory social recognition.

Epistemic responsibility is derived from the ethical nature of the Ego-Alter relations and is one of the axioms of dialogical epistemology of daily living. Like other dialogical axioms, it is relational. This is exemplified by Rommetveit’s and Arendt’s cases, which show that both the assumed epistemic equality and inequality between the Self and Other can entail epistemic responsibility or its denial.

Examples of Bakhtin and Levinas illustrate that epistemic responsibility takes on different forms. According to Bakhtin’s perspective the Ego cannot escape responsibility uniqueness and integrity. In Levinas’s perspective the Self’s responsibility for the Other is unlimited and unquestionable: it is the primary principle of human existence. Responsibility for the Other takes the form of action in the face of injustice. If my neighbour commits an evil act against Others, then I am responsible if I do not act on behalf of Justice.

Among contemporary challenges to epistemic responsibility is bureaucratization that penetrates institutions like health services and universities. An assault on sciences by bureaucratization, Patočka noted, is also an assault on the principle of scientific conscience, which must be resisted by establishing scientific solidarity among practicing scientists. Patočka calls for conscience and epistemic responsibility of scientists and professionals.