Chapter 4 turns to the philosophical investigation into the nature of temporal experience, particularly whether the dynamic content of our temporal experience can be reconciled with the block universe model of temporal reality. Qureshi-Hurst argues that the supporter of the block universe has options, and the A-theorist’s argument from experience is not as powerful as they claim.

This chapter introduces the key metaphysical concepts that are integral to understanding the nature of time. It also critically assesses the leading arguments in this intellectual landscape, arguing that there are compelling metaphysical reasons to endorse a B-theory or C-theory and reject all A-theories (particularly presentism, the growing block, and the moving spotlight).

Chapter 3 considers a set of arguments, presented by Richard Swinburne and William Lane Craig, claiming that General Relativity can save the A-theory by substantiating objective passage via cosmic time. This argument is assessed and found wanting.

In this chapter, Qureshi-Hurst turns towards empirical science, introducing Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity and arguing that its most compelling interpretation is committed to the existence of the block universe. The neo-Lorentzian interpretation is analysed and rejected.

Chapter 7 contains Qureshi-Hurst’s articulation of the problem of salvation in the block universe and explores in detail her original solution. She argues that salvation is best understood as a subjective transformation.

I claim that both Being and Becoming are incarnated in a cosmological model within the causal set approach to quantum gravity in which spacetime is fundamentally discrete. I argue that, in the model, Being is subjective whereas Becoming is objective.

Quantum gravity is expected to require modifications of the notions of space and time. I discuss and clarify how this happens in loop quantum gravity.