Search

Skip to main content Accessibility help

Home
Search

Only show content I have access to (0)

Articles (1)

Over 3 years (1)

From year:

To year:

Apply

Philosophy (1)

attitudinal theory of feeling

Kantian Review (1)

View selected items
Save to my bookmarks
Export citations
Download PDF (zip)
Save to Kindle
Save to Dropbox
Save to Google Drive
Save content to
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to .

To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Please be advised that item(s) you selected are not available.
You are about to save
Your Kindle email address

Please provide your Kindle email.

@free.kindle.com @kindle.com (service fees apply)

By using this service, you agree that you will only keep content for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services

1 results

Kant on Feelings, Sensations and the Gap Between Rationality and Morality
Alexander Rueger
Journal:

Kantian Review / Volume 25 / Issue 1 / March 2020

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

10 February 2020, pp. 125-148

Print publication:

March 2020
- Article
- - Get access
    
    Check if you have access via personal or institutional login
    
    Log in Register
- Export citation
In §3 of the Critique of Judgement Kant argues that if the feeling of pleasure were a sensation distinct from whatever representation gives rise to the feeling, then we would be – in the terminology of the Metaphysics of Morals – rational beings (vernünftige Wesen) but not moral beings (Vernunftwesen); we would inescapably (and blamelessly) be hedonists. I reconstruct this at first glance strange argument and suggest, first, that Kant’s actual view of pleasure is an attitudinal theory that avoids the problem of hedonism. Second, the argument of §3 is to be understood in the context of Kant’s emphasis on moral feeling and its cultivation in his writings since the Critique of Practical Reason.