The discourse of tragedy has significant value in a military context, reminding us of the temptations of hubris, the prevalence of moral dilemmas, and the inescapable limits of foresight. Today, however, this discourse is drawn upon too heavily. Within the tragicized politics of nuclear and drone violence, foreseeable and solvable problems are reconceptualized as intractable dilemmas, and morally accountable agents are reframed as powerless observers. The tragedy discourse, when wrongly applied by policymakers and the media, indulges the very hubris the tragic recognition is intended to caution against. This article clarifies the limits of “tragedy” in the context of military violence and argues for a renewed focus on political responsibility.

Many ancient African societies had advanced and sophisticated humanitarian protection mechanisms and war codes to regulate the conduct of armed hostilities. A careful examination of both historical and contemporary African customs and traditions provides unique avenues through which to interpret and apply international humanitarian protection in armed conflict. As a sub-branch of international law, international humanitarian law (IHL) seeks to limit the excesses of warfare and regulate the conduct of armed hostilities. However, international conventions such as those of IHL remain severely constrained if they are not framed and reconciled with indigenous understandings and meanings of humanitarian protection. In non-international armed conflicts specifically, this enduring challenge demands that IHL conventions and other international conventions be framed and understood within indigenous frameworks that support local ownership of this internationalized body of law. Encouraging dialogue between international norms and indigenous practices can enhance the relevance, authority and legitimacy of IHL in Africa.

International humanitarian law (IHL) provides the normative foundation for efforts to address the issue of missing persons during and after armed conflict. Whilst IHL does not engage with how parties to an armed conflict may go about restoring peace, there has been speculation that resolving the missing issue, by bringing answers to families about the fate and whereabouts of their missing relatives, can potentially play a role in building peace. This article represents an effort to compile existing evidence in academic and practice literature that supports an understanding of how addressing the missing issue relates to peacebuilding. In so doing, the article seeks to lay out a research agenda to understand how addressing the issue of the missing can serve to advance peacebuilding, and proposes avenues for further research.

The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the crucial role of technology in modern warfare. The use of digital networks, information infrastructure, space technology, and artificial intelligence has distinct military advantages, but raises challenges as well. This essay focuses on the way it exacerbates a rather familiar challenge: the “civilianization of warfare.” Today's high-technology warfare lowers the threshold for civilian participation in the war effort. A notable example is the widespread use of smartphone apps by Ukrainian civilians, who thereby help the armed forces defend against Russian aggression. Through the lenses of international humanitarian law, conventional just war theory, and revisionist just war theory, this essay evaluates the normative dimensions of such civilian participation. The analysis shows that civilians can lose their legal protections when they use these apps to directly participate in hostilities, and this loss of immunity can be justified by Michael Walzer's conventional just war theory. Revisionism, however, puts the justness of the war at the forefront, and so sheds doubt on the moral liability of Ukrainian civilians. Considering the broader implications, including the blurring combatant-civilian distinction, indicates that such civilianization of warfare should not be welcomed; the risks will often outweigh the benefits. At a minimum, states ought to exercise restraint in mobilizing civilians and inform them of the implications of their actions.

Since commencing its illegal invasion in 2022, the Russian military and authorities have committed numerous war crimes against the people of Ukraine. These include the mutilation and execution of combatants; the torture, kidnapping, forced expulsion, rape, and massacre of civilians; and indiscriminate attacks on densely populated areas. In this essay, I evaluate the strategic implications of this misconduct, focusing exclusively on Western responses. I argue that war crimes can and often do negatively impact the strategic goals of the perpetrator, but whether and how this occurs is rarely governed exclusively by the offending action. Western perceptions of battlefield atrocity, shaped as they are by identity, race, and politics, may radically shift from one context to another. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine war, the status of both the participants and the conflict itself has helped inculcate a particular sensitivity among Western actors to the battlefield criminality of Russia. Drawing on evidence from the 2022 Bucha massacre and the ongoing bombing of Ukrainian civilians, I argue that Russian misconduct has consolidated Western support for the Ukrainian military effort, politically, diplomatically, and materially.

With the advent of socio-technical systems that gather and process personal data, the capacity to identify and even locate people in an automated fashion has dramatically increased. This article discusses what militaries need to know about data protection and the right to digital privacy/private life when personal data is processed. The focus in this discussion is on sensitive data that makes individuals identifiable. It is here argued that the right to data protection and the right to digital privacy/private life are distinctive and separate rights and should be treated as such, despite some overlaps. Although the law of armed conflict approaches processing of sensitive data in a topical manner, it remains firm on the delimitation between what is permissible and what becomes unlawful when it comes to processing data. This article illustrates that elements of both data protection and protection of the right to privacy/private life can be traced in the law of armed conflict. In fact, both rights remain distinctive also in times of armed conflict and must be separately protected through obligations of result as well as obligations of conduct.

This article outlines and evaluates several unique challenges associated with legal support to special operations. It describes the essential differences between special tactics, techniques and procedures and conventional military operations. It offers a US perspective on how treaty and customary international laws apply to various special operations, including precision attacks against “high-value targets”, hostage rescue missions, and support to partner and proxy forces. It examines the benefits and drawbacks of heavy reliance on special operations during armed conflict, including an assessment of the legal challenges that arise when special operations forces become a primary feature of a military campaign. Finally, it highlights how the assumption of substantial military and political risk impacts the application of international law to special operations at the tactical level.

The relationship between armed conflict, the environment and climate change is intricate and challenging to define. While international humanitarian law (IHL) includes some environmental protections, it did not anticipate the connection to climate change. Climate change can act as a risk multiplier, intensifying negative socio-economic impacts, and conflict-related environmental damage may contribute to climate change. Bridging these fields is crucial, and to this end, this article seeks to interpret IHL considering evolving understandings of armed conflict effects and progress under international environmental law (IEL). The article illustrates how existing norms can address climate change impacts in warfare, and explores how relevant IEL provisions, such as the Paris Agreement and the harm prevention principle, could be applied during armed conflicts to achieve similar goals.

Since Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, there have been thousands of instances of civilian casualties, damage to the natural environment and cultural property, destruction of buildings and infrastructure, blockading of ports, siege, capturing installations containing dangerous forces, and other consequences that accompany hostilities. In addition to the fatalities related to humans (civilians and combatants alike) and their property or environment, the war in Ukraine has also accounted for non-human tolls – namely, the destruction of animals or damage to their habitats.

The primary objective of this article is to study three patterns of animal suffering documented during Russia's invasion of Ukraine: (i) targeting zoos and killing zoo animals; (ii) extermination of the Black Sea dolphin population; and (iii) eating pigeons or other pets in besieged localities, and to analyse these patterns in the light of applicable rules of international humanitarian law (IHL).

The idea of this research is to underline that war can have a significant effect on various categories of animals, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine is just another example of this. The article also discusses how, and the extent to which international law can provide protection for animals in armed conflict, and whether there are any gaps in the applicable IHL rules related to the protection of animals.

The principle of prohibiting forced labour exists in both treaty and customary international law. However, there are limits to this prohibition, in that certain types of forced labour are actually permitted; this is the case for forced labour performed by prisoners of war (PoWs). This paper examines the legal regime applicable to such labour. It starts by setting out the current rules, following a brief historical review. It then explains the shortcomings of those rules, which are open to abuse and are not focused exclusively on the rights and interests of the PoWs, before proposing two possible ways of improving the situation by means of a systemic approach. The first is based on international humanitarian law itself, while the second is based on the complementary relationship between that body of law and international human rights law. Such improvements would give PoWs the right to perform any available work while continuing to require them to carry out work exclusively dedicated to running the PoW camp.

The concept of humanity has been much discussed with respect to humanitarian work and international humanitarian law. There is today an idea of a single humanity, with each member equally valued beyond superficial differences in belief, nationality, ethnicity etc., and a global legal framework exists to prevent needless human suffering, including in war.

Dehumanization arises linguistically as the negation of a common, positive and mutually supportive humanity, though there is no single definition, and it certainly predates its opposite. Research indicates that dehumanization increases the risk of conflict/violence, increases the risk of abuses therein, and makes it harder to resolve conflict.

This paper gives an overview of how humanity is currently defined and used, notably by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as one Fundamental Principle of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and what dehumanization means especially in relation to conflict and violence. The paper then explores why and how dehumanization happens and the real-world harm that can result when it is espoused or tacitly condoned by those in positions of power. Finally, the paper examines how global legal frameworks and the principle of humanity, bolstered by impartiality, independence and neutrality, in particular as enacted by the ICRC, work to curb and push back against some of the worst harms that dehumanization can cause.

The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War provides a practical and effective framework for the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts that has retained its relevance for 75 years since its adoption. As with all treaties, its ‘object and purpose’ has a concrete impact on how its terms are interpreted, giving insights into the ordinary meaning of the text and allowing the aim of the Convention to be fully realized. This article asks and answers a series of questions to elucidate the role of the object and purpose in treaty interpretation and how to identify the object and purpose of a given treaty before focusing on the specificities of international humanitarian law treaties. On that basis, it determines that the overall ‘object and purpose’ of the Convention is to protect civilians during armed conflict, including in circumstances where they are subject to permissible measures of control and security. The article then demonstrates how that ‘object and purpose’ assists with the resolution of specific, well-known interpretive dilemmas including the determination of protected status under the Convention and the application of provisions premised on the existence of a Protecting Power.

The notion of solidarity, although not new to the humanitarian sector, has re-emerged in recent discussions about effective and ethical humanitarian action, particularly in contexts such as Ukraine and Myanmar where the traditional humanitarian principles have been facing certain pressures. Because solidarity appears as a good but can also involve selectivity and privilege, and because it risks continued militarism and normalization of civilians participating within that militarism, the notion of solidarity merits rich and rigorous thinking. This article explores how the notion of solidarity is being utilized by those currently re-emphasizing its importance and what it might mean in practice in today's humanitarian contexts. The article argues that if solidary action involves not only a political stance but solidary working methods, the recent calls for solidarity demand respect for the variety of principles and practices within the humanitarian ecosystem, while nevertheless upholding mutual obligations owed within that professional community – that is, within careful limits as to what is considered humanitarian action.