This chapter presents the main theoretical argument of the book. It starts by discussing the role of representation in the Madisonian baseline. It then argues that several assumptions that may have held at the founding no longer held by the turn of the (last) century, giving rise to an acute problem of trust between the electorate and representatives. A partial solution to this problem, the chapter contends, is for the legislature to delegate authority to administrative bodies and to constrain their actions through administrative law. Under this scheme, the legislature establishes objectives (e.g., fair and reasonable railroad rates), and administrative bodies establish the means in publicly credible ways. Delegated authority thereby tends to improve the public’s welfare, as well as to serve the electoral interests of representatives who suffer under less suspicion. The appendix to this chapter presents a formalization of this argument.

This chapter lays out the core claims of the book and situates the theory in the literature. It emphasizes the limitations of the common view about expertise as a rationale for the administrative state and begins to substantiate the case for viewing credible reasoning as its distinctive feature. The chapter also contains a roadmap of the remainder of the book, previewing the argument, case studies, empirics, and normative and doctrinal conclusions.