An overview of testing and measurement in North America is provided, covering topics related to privacy laws and regulations, online proctoring, artificial intelligence, accommodations, accessibility, and the “opt out of testing” movement that are currently defining measurement in North America. This is not to say that these challenges are unique to North America; in fact, the challenges related to these topics are being faced all over the world in varying degrees and the same opportunities exist, but these topics are of particular importance when it comes to measurement and assessment in North America. Building on these observations, a discussion of how advances in technology and computing power provide an opportunity to challenge the status quo related to assessment; these advancements will allow assessment of skills in more authentic ways that will provide better insight into someone’s knowledge, skills, and abilities. The question we should be asking and attempting to answer is “How can assessment developers leverage the power of the cloud and technology to measure skills more accurately and create higher fidelity in the assessment process?”

Chapter 6 focuses on special treatment stigma—the stigma that accompanies the need for any modifications in the workplace. First, I present evidence that employers are reluctant to accommodate workers regardless of whether the accommodation is needed because of a disability, pregnancy, or caregiving responsibilities. Second, I describe what happens when employers do accommodate workers—both in terms of what workplace consequences flow from those accommodations, and how those accommodations affect the accommodated employees’ relationships with their coworkers.

The goal of Chapter 5 is to demonstrate how entrenched these norms are in most workplaces and to explain why this entrenchment exists. I first provide a history of many of the most common structural norms, including hours, shifts, and attendance policies, before demonstrating just how entrenched these norms are. Finally, this chapter briefly discusses the work-from-home experiment courtesy of COVID-19.

Chapter 7 first explores the theory behind protecting people with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities. It then explores the practical justifications for protecting these groups of employees. Finally, it explains why my proposals go beyond protecting specific groups of employees and instead protected everyone.

This chapter focuses on the language learner and emphasises the importance of a classroom which is inclusive and which, at the same time, caters for learner differences. It discusses aptitude, how learners vary considerably in terms of the strengths that they bring to the language classroom, and how experienced teachers will usually have some understanding of the particular strengths of individual students. It stresses the importance of variety in the language classroom in terms of catering to individual differences in learning, but also considering students’ interests and preferences as well as strengths and needs. It explores some of the recent thinking about language learning motivation, and learner engagement, drawing from both applied linguistics and educational psychology. There is an emphasis on the importance of positive classroom language learning experiences, illustrated through examples from classrooms and the voices of students and teachers. Some of the types of special learning needs or ‘differences’ a teacher may encounter in the language classroom are outlined. General principles for accommodating these learners, illustrated with classroom examples, are presented.

Christopher Tollefsen addresses institutions’ conscience rights. The Supreme Court’s description in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby of the rights of religious corporations affects that question. Institutional conscience attracts more skepticism than individual conscience. Skeptics wonder if an institution can have a conscience or make others respect it. Some medical institutions, looking to exercise conscience, ask if they should be forced to offer patients all services the law allows, including abortion, sterilization, physician-aided suicide and gender transition. If they don’t, others fear unwanted costs to clients and employees. Hobby Lobby involved a closely-held corporation’s refusal to obey a law mandating the purchase of health insurance covering drugs and devices that could destroy an embryo. In other institutional conscience cases, religion could be exercised by the group-subject’s doing or abstaining from acts, as a group and for religious reasons. As in Hobby Lobby, shielding group conscience claims, through corporations, vindicates humans’ rights to achieve certain ends: business efficiencies and the goods of working as a family and as co-believers.

Mark Rienzi observes the tension in the United States' pluralistic democracy between religious diversity and majority rule. He notes that the Supreme Court has forged a path of religious accommodation, versus forced conformity, and this has not led to anarchy. In the past, the Court and legislatures have sometimes pushed limited religious toleration or even forced conformity. Today, the accommodationist path is illustrated in the Court’s second Jehovah’s Witness-pledge case, and in legislative and Supreme Court treatment of conscientious objectors to military service. Conscience protections for those opposed to abortion have been strong Roe v. Wade in 1973. They have been extended to institutions and individuals, and often protect religious and non-religious objections. Even following the Court’s 1990 case curtailing mandatory Free Exercise accommodations, Congress and many states adopted statutory religious conscience protections. Many states interpreted their state constitutions to provide protections for religious freedom. This has not resulted in anarchy but has preserved the ability of many medical professionals and religious social service institutions to continue their services.