This chapter begins by setting out the central elements of the distinctive idea of “the self” (das Selbst) that we find in Hegel’s Phenomenology. It demonstrates that the self must be understood as a determination of “spirit,” of the reciprocal interaction between self-conscious beings and their shared social world, so that Hegel defends a “social constitution” conception of the self. Conceptions of the self prescribe determinate relations of self-conscious beings to their actions and to one another, and depend on distinctive forms of language. It tracks the first two conceptions of the self that emerge in the text, that of the person, and of absolute freedom, and unpacks the criticisms of these conceptions implicit in Hegel’s account. While personhood can be affirmed universally of everyone, it is alienating since it cannot include individuals’ particularity. While individuals can understand themselves in terms of the norms of absolute freedom, that conception of the self undermines the bases for relations of reciprocity among them. It concludes by considering the implications of Hegel’s critiques for Stephen Darwall’s conception of recognition.