The year 1720 witnessed the world’s first international financial crisis. Instead of retelling the standard narrative that focuses on John Law and his System, this chapter uses the records of the stock speculator James Brydges during the Mississippi and South Sea Bubbles to illustrate the different capacity for impunity in the 1720 crisis. Changes in impunity were due to the expansion in the complexity of finance, and the fraught process of trying to establish central banks as the main institutional form of immune actors in that new complex financial world. The financial bubbles of 1720 were connected by flows of capital, information, and personnel, which were beyond the capacity of either the French or the British government to regulate. For the first time, financial instruments and techniques existed, which were beyond the understanding of the educated amateur and were powerful enough to provoke wide-ranging economic disorder.

This chapter demonstrates the importance of Paul de Rapin-Thoyras (1661–1725) for subsequent discussion of political parties in the eighteenth century. Before his famous Histoire d’Angleterre (1724–7), the Frenchman had already made a name for himself by writing a pamphlet entitled Une Dissertation sur les Whigs et les Torys (1717), which is the chief focus of this chapter, although the Histoire is also briefly surveyed and contextualised. The chapter examines Rapin’s intervention against the backdrop of his expulsion from France along with other Huguenots in 1685, the Glorious Revolution of 1688–9, and the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. By focusing on Rapin’s Dissertation, this chapter demonstrates the centrality of religion and religious denominations in the construction of political parties. In political theory, Rapin’s Dissertation can be regarded as an intellectual milestone, as it was the first clear expression of the idea that balance between parties, as distinct from Machiavelli’s social orders, is recommendable as a way to achieve proper balance in a mixed constitution.