Much has been written of John Courtney Murray’s reception of Thomas Aquinas. Although not totally misplaced, this near-exclusive attention to Aquinas’s role in Murray’s thought has obscured the contributions of an equally important figure—Augustine of Hippo—to Murray’s political theology. This article thus offers a novel survey of Murray’s seminal We Hold These Truths and reveals that Augustine’s theory of Divine Providence, as articulated in The City of God, circumscribed Murray’s Thomism. With the hope of reconciling differences between American Catholics and non-Catholics at mid-century, Murray relied upon two of the most influential theologians in western Christianity to assert that Divine Providence led the Founding Fathers to place the natural law and religious liberty at the foundation of the American republic.

In recent years, a considerable amount of interest has arisen in the topic of existential inertia (henceforth EIT)and its relation to the natural theology of Thomas Aquinas. While contemporary Thomists have engaged with proponents of EIT, strangely enough, no literature has focused on Aquinas’s own response to the objection(s) from an EIT-like position. The intention of this article is to (1) lay out the basic thrust of EIT and then (2) articulate how Aquinas’s own metaphysical commitments dissolve the problems that EIT raises. After formulating an argument based on Aqunias’s own texts and paying attention to the metaphysical commitments it involves, I then level three objections and respond to them.

This paper introduces Phenomenological Thomism by accomplishing the three tasks Thomas Aquinas sets for every prooemium. First, to promote goodwill (beniuolus), it shows how fruitful Phenomenological Thomism promises to be by arguing that it unites the strengths of two complementary alternatives to the modern starting point. Second, to make teachable (docilis), it delineates the principal vectors of phenomenological engagement, including philosophy of nature, philosophical anthropology, ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophical theology, and revealed theology. Third, to arouse attention (attentus), it focuses on the theme of manifestation to highlight the challenge of bringing the two traditions together. In this way, the prooemium encourages the further development of Phenomenological Thomism as a research program involving countless scholars and an infinity of tasks.

From 1923 to the present day, various studies have increasingly analysed the beginnings of the cult of Thomas Aquinas, as well as the authenticity of his works. Over the last century, the reception of Thomas Aquinas between these two poles of sanctity and the authority accorded to his works has shown itself to be a significant pairing, of which this article unpacks some important stages.

Science-engaged theology has emerged as a new way of conducting research within the vast field of science and religion, with the aim of, at least in one way of understanding it today, solving theological puzzles. In this article we suggest that an analysis of the diversity of approaches in which thirteenth-century philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas engaged theological questions with the best knowledge of the natural world available at the time allows twenty-first century science-engaged theologians to move forward the discussion about the different ways of engaging theology with the contemporary natural sciences.

Much of historic Christian philosophical theology has affirmed that God not only exists, but is Existence itself. Nowadays, this claim is widely rejected as unintelligible by theists and non-theists alike. I argue in contrast that if there is such a thing as Existence itself, that thing must be a maximally excellent being, which is what many philosophers call God. This is because Existence would itself need to exist, which is only possible if Existence exists in a paradigmatic way, that is, as a perfect instance of existence. My argument thus offers both a defence of the coherence of the claim that God is Existence itself, and a new way of arguing for theism.

We note how Gerald Vann's pastoral context fired his concerns, and examine part of his output, especially his Lectorate thesis, Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Divine Pity, and The Son's Course. He popularised insights drawn from Aquinas and Neo-Thomists, developed in conversation with his brethren, while critically welcoming other traditions and modern culture. He rooted creative thought in Thomist doctrine, and offered Aquinas's vision as an answer to prevalent forms of disintegration. Some of his ideas and expressions are ‘of their time’; his urging an ever fresh contemplation of Christ, and his approach to the Gospel ‘paradox’ of renouncing all things for God's sake, while sharing God's love for creatures, are recognized as a powerful statement of recurring Christian themes. Vann was ahead of his time in sharing widely the distinctively Thomist account of the Spirit's role in guiding our pilgrimage, working unity, and divinizing our perceptions through his Seven Gifts. In this Vann was faithful to the Thomist vision he developed in his formal studies, of the eternal Processions of the Divine Wisdom and the Holy Spirit lying behind the coming of creatures from God and, more excitingly still, lying behind our return to our Triune Archetype.

Thomism is a contested category that exhibits considerable plasticity in its application. An examination of the role played by such invocations of proper names in contemporary theological discourse indicates the importance of textual accessibility and engagement. The role played by texts is examined in terms of an often-elided distinction between ‘intelligibility’ and ‘readability’, with the former aligned with propositional contents and the latter a more expansive attentiveness to the text's performative operations. The historical remoteness of Aquinas coupled with the importation into theology of secularised reading strategies is seen to have alienated the full readability of Aquinas's texts. Acting against Cartesian modes of reading, Cornelius Ernst's re-performance of Thomistic pedagogy as ‘engaged contemplation’ is concerned to enact a horizon of meaning within which Aquinas's texts retain enduring readability. This article develops Ernst's Thomistic meta-theology into an account of Thomism as ‘meta-reading’. On this account, authentic Thomism involves the intentional cultivation of a total human culture, within which the inherently theological discipline of textual engagement exercises a quasi-liturgical function.

Recent scholarship suggests that Bonaventure breaks with the Augustinian tradition, in part, by affirming that the mind's cognitive powers remain fully activated even after the fall. I suggest that this claim concerning Bonaventure's denial of the noetic effects of sin should be reconsidered. I provide evidence to show that Bonaventure did, indeed, affirm that the intellect was heavily damaged by the fall and that Bonaventure affirmed two at first seemingly paradoxical propositions: (1) the intellect is indeed damaged by the fall, and (2) that God remains the first thing known by the intellect. It is precisely Bonaventure's coupling of these two seemingly paradoxical propositions that have led some to underplay Bonaventure's affirmation of the noetic effects of sin. In other words, Bonaventure's model opens up the possibility of affirming that the results of the noetic effects of sin consists not in ignorance of God simpliciter, but in a paradoxical state of knowing-yet-not-knowing God, akin to Paul's account of Romans 1.

In this paper, I explore the axiological status of work. I engage with a number of prominent natural law theorists who consider it a basic human good and explain why their arguments fail. In the process, I put forward a novel argument against the very possibility of work being considered a basic good. I conclude that whilst work may be very important to us psychologically and instrumentally it should not be considered a basic human good.

Animalism, according to its strongest proponents, is the view that human beings are ‘essentially or most fundamentally animals’. Specifically, ‘we are essentially animals if we couldn't possibly exist without being animals’ (Olson 2008). Although contemporary animalism offers an account superior to its Lockean competitors, Olson's ‘biological approach’ has certain limitations, particularly in its denial of any psychological continuity whatsoever as either necessary or sufficient for individual persistence through time. I propose a number of amendments towards a Thomistic variety of animalism that avoids these difficulties. Although prone to misinterpretation, animalism understood properly is compatible with Aquinas's theory of subsistent intellect. Against recent challenges, I defend the view that Thomistic animalism not only is intelligible, but is indeed crucial for understanding Aquinas's view of human nature and rationality.

The twentieth century has seen a dramatic shift even within Catholic theology when it comes to how the Church understands divine revelation and her own historical reception of it. The Second Vatican Council was a pivotal point in which contrasting views of doctrinal truth seemed to meet head-to-head. But while it might seem that the now popular understanding of revelation as an event, rather than a set of propositions, represents a victory for modernism, there is no contradiction between this personalistic paradigm and the propositional, which reigned in the neo-scholastic era. Rather, there are points of contact between the traditional Thomistic approach of an early-twentieth century Dominican theologian, Francisco Marin-Sola, and the understanding of revelation, particularly, the nature of doctrinal truth, that has risen to prominence thanks to the so-called nouvelle theologie. It is especially evident in the work of Yves Congar and Joseph Ratzinger that it is possible to reconcile the Tubingen approach to reality, which inspired the new school, and the (Augustinian-)Thomistic insistence on the immutability of truth.

Capitalizing on the diversity of ways in which the phrase “the end of ethics” can be interpreted, this article explores how, from a Thomistic perspective, the virtue of prudence might be considered the “end” of ethics. After bringing to light certain problematic aspects of the relationship between ethics and prudence, it is argued that Aquinas’ understanding of the intellectual virtues allows for a clear line to be drawn between the two. In this way, it is possible to say where ethics “ends” and prudence begins. This answer, however, seems to raise a further difficulty which, upon resolution, reveals a sense in which prudence is also the “end” of ethics when “end” is taken to mean its goal.

Although Étienne Gilson did not change his position on Christian philosophy as defined in his 1931 Gifford Lectures, interesting modifications occur in his later formulations. Whereas Gilson's earlier formulations emphasized philosophy searching within the faith for what can become rational, his later formulations during the 1960s placed more emphasis on its Christian aspect, i.e., faith guiding reason. In the 1960s, Gilson emphasized faith and the Church as the guardians of Christian philosophy, expressed a relative indifference to the validity of rational proofs for the existence of God, and empathized with those accepting questionable philosophical approaches to understand the faith. Post-modernism with its rejection of a “pure” or “scientific” methodology in philosophy serves as an appropriate context in which to situate Gilson's later formulation of Christian philosophy.

The issue of hyper-specialization within the various academic fields has often been raised in the context of recent discussions concerning the purpose or end of the modern university. Theology, one such field in which continual specialization seems prevalent, is further complicated by questions regarding the relationship between faith and the scientific character of theology, as well as the role of the university with regard to that relationship. Though seemingly diverse, a resolution to both of these questions may be found by giving an account of how the sciences, like theology, are specified. It is the purpose of the present article to explore the classical Thomistic position on this subject, and to apply its principles to the case of theology. It is shown that the specification of a science can be understood in terms of both the “formal object which” is known in a given science and the “formal object under which” it is known. The former can provide a correct starting point for managing the multiplicity of “sub-fields” and various specializations within the science of theology, while the latter can help to answer the question of the interrelation between faith and theology as a science in a university setting.

Atheism, the thesis that God does not exist and Thomism, the thesis that there are “proofs” for the existence of God based on experience and reason can be juxtaposed to each other as two extremes. On the other hand, the very statement of each implies the need to consider the other, so that the atheist and the Thomist both claim to belong to rational discourse, however much they differ in conclusions. The scriptural tradition has consistently found the one who says there is “no God” to be “foolish,” that is, someone with more than just an intellectual error.