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A new characterization of tabularity in tense logic is established, namely, a tense logic L is tabular if and only if $\mathsf {tab}_n^T\in L$ for some $n\geq 1$. Two characterization theorems for the Post-completeness in tabular tense logics are given. Furthermore, a characterization of the Post-completeness in the lattice of all tense logics is established. Post numbers of some tense logics are shown.
We show that monadic intuitionistic quantifiers admit the following temporal interpretation: “always in the future” (for
$\forall $
) and “sometime in the past” (for
$\exists $
). It is well known that Prior’s intuitionistic modal logic
${\sf MIPC}$
axiomatizes the monadic fragment of the intuitionistic predicate logic, and that
${\sf MIPC}$
is translated fully and faithfully into the monadic fragment
${\sf MS4}$
of the predicate
${\sf S4}$
via the Gödel translation. To realize the temporal interpretation mentioned above, we introduce a new tense extension
${\sf TS4}$
of
${\sf S4}$
and provide a full and faithful translation of
${\sf MIPC}$
into
${\sf TS4}$
. We compare this new translation of
${\sf MIPC}$
with the Gödel translation by showing that both
${\sf TS4}$
and
${\sf MS4}$
can be translated fully and faithfully into a tense extension of
${\sf MS4}$
, which we denote by
${\sf MS4.t}$
. This is done by utilizing the relational semantics for these logics. As a result, we arrive at the diagram of full and faithful translations shown in Figure 1 which is commutative up to logical equivalence. We prove the finite model property (fmp) for
${\sf MS4.t}$
using algebraic semantics, and show that the fmp for the other logics involved can be derived as a consequence of the fullness and faithfulness of the translations considered.
In this work we present some new contributions towards two different directions in the study of modal logic. First we employ tense logics to provide a temporal interpretation of intuitionistic quantifiers as “always in the future” and “sometime in the past.” This is achieved by modifying the Gödel translation and resolves an asymmetry between the standard interpretation of intuitionistic quantifiers.
Then we generalize the classic Gelfand–Naimark–Stone duality between compact Hausdorff spaces and uniformly complete bounded archimedean
$\ell $
-algebras to a duality encompassing compact Hausdorff spaces with continuous relations. This leads to the notion of modal operators on bounded archimedean
$\ell $
-algebras and in particular on rings of continuous real-valued functions on compact Hausdorff spaces. This new duality is also a generalization of the classic Jónsson-Tarski duality in modal logic.
A-theorists think there is a fundamental difference between the present and other times. This concern shows up in what kinds of properties they take to be instantiated, what objects they think exist and how they formalize their views. Nearly every contemporary A-theorist assumes that her metaphysics requires a tense logic – a logic with operators like (‘it was the case that...’) and (‘it will be the case that...’). In this paper, I show that there is at least one viable A-theory that does not require a logic with tense operators. And I will argue that three common indispensability arguments for tense operators are unsound.
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