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It is no secret that migrant destination countries have become increasingly interested in regulating migrant inflows. We discuss in this chapter some potential tools of migration management suggested by other scholars – notably, border restrictions and fortification, foreign aid, and bilateral trade agreements. We turn the conversation toward a different area of policy: labor market access. We argue that migrant-receiving countries interested in regulating migration can do so by creating temporary labor market access for people from sending countries. Allowing some migrants formal employment opportunities significantly increases the amount of remittances they send home, a financial resource that family members can use to finance their immobility rather than sending additional family members abroad. We use an array of data and empirical specifications to make the case that labor market access increases remittances, and that this increase in remittances reduces subsequent authorized and unauthorized migration to the United States. Our findings suggest that countries interested in managing migration pressures have an incentive to open up more temporary pathways to the formal labor market for migrants.
Chapter 5 considers the challenge presented by new threats to deport long-settled members of communities who do not formally enjoy the legal status of citizen, but rather are classed as “undocumented” or “illegal” migrants. These include the Dreamers, the Windrush generation, and those with Temporary Protected Status who have had that status revoked under the Trump presidency. I differentiate between five kinds of cases that raise some slightly different issues. I show why deportation for the long-settled involves grave injustices on a par with violating some of our most basic human rights. Evicting long-settled members would undermine legitimacy in several ways. Such actions threaten state’s rights to exercise power legitimately by undermining core internal, system, and contribution requirements. And I show why the arguments used in defense of community members’ alleged rights to continued occupation would be undermined by such evictions. In such cases, states may not claim a justifiable right to continued occupation nor can they claim that such a right entitles them to evict long-settled members of the community residing on that territory.
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