Recent research has shown that forward-looking Taylor rules are subject to indeterminacy in New Keynesian models with capital and investment spending. This paper shows that adopting a forward-looking Wicksellian rule that responds to the price level, rather than to inflation, is one potential remedy for the indeterminacy problem. This result is shown to be robust to variations in both the labor supply elasticity and the degree of price stickiness, the inclusion of capital adjustments costs, and if output also enters into the interest-rate feedback rule. Finally, it is shown that the superiority of Wicksellian rules over Taylor rules is not only confined to forward-looking policy, but also extends to both backward-looking and contemporaneous-looking specifications of the monetary policy rule.

This paper develops a medium-scale New Keynesian model where consumer preferences depend on government expenditures and public capital is productivity-enhancing in order to account for recent evidence on the effects of government spending shocks. Under plausible assumptions on the degree of complementarity between private and public expenditures and on the output elasticity of public spending and considering alternative monetary policy rules, the effects of fiscal shocks delivered by the model are in line with the evidence.

To what extent did deviations from the Taylor rule between 2002 and 2006 help to promote price stability and maximum sustainable employment? To address that question, I estimate a New Keynesian model with unemployment and perform a counterfactual experiment where monetary policy strictly follows a Taylor rule over the period 2002:Q1–2006:Q4. I find that such a policy would have generated a sizeable increase in unemployment and resulted in an undesirably low rate of inflation. Around mid-2004, when the counterfactual deviates the most from the actual series, the model indicates that the probability of an unemployment rate greater than 8% would have been as high as 80%, whereas the probability of an inflation rate above 1% would have been close to zero.

High degrees of relative risk aversion induce indeterminacy in cash-in-advance economies. This paper finds that Taylor-style policies can preempt such sunspot equilibria. Specific policy recommendations depend on the fundamentals of the economy, i.e. the empirically true value of coefficient of relative risk aversion.