Introduces the economic crisis that the US is currently experiencing and the reasons why industrial policy is the right solution to it.

Explains the several dozen policy tools governments have used in the past and use today to impose effective industrial policies on their economies.

The WTO is founded on commitments that governments make to each other in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. These rules provide a structure for international trade in which governments are generally restricted in when they can raise tariffs on imports and whether they can discriminate among their trading partners. This chapter examines the contemporary framework for international trade and its main rules, including national treatment, bound tariffs, and most-favored nation, as well as the WTO’s dispute settlement process. The Shrimp-Turtle case provides an illustration of how these rules interact with international politics to create new political dynamics.

This chapter discusses Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace as a matrix for understanding the changing institutional landscape of international trade. In 1919, Keynes highlighted the perils of German participation and US non-participation in international politics, twin problems that continued to frame trade debates in the League of Nations for the remainder of the 1920s. Generally, German leaders supported the construction of an open and regulated world economy. Many internationalists were eager to lock Germany into a system of multilateral norms but also feared that integrating Germany into global markets would reinforce its dominance in key strategic sectors. In contrast, the United States remained aloof from League trade negotiations in the 1920s. Europeans were divided over whether to respond with universal trade rules that the United States might eventually be persuaded to follow or with a regionalist approach that would enable Europeans to negotiate directly with their Atlantic neighbour on a more equal footing. As Keynes saw clearly, both sets of concerns were exacerbated by the financial imbalances stemming from war debts and reparations.

This chapter investigates the degree of pass-through from import prices and tariffs to wholesale prices in interwar Britain using a new high-frequency micro data set. The main results are: (i) Pass-through from import prices and tariffs to wholesale prices was economically and statistically significant. (ii) Despite devaluation, import prices exacerbated deflation in the early 1930s because of the global slump in export prices. (iii) Rising protection, however, was a mild stimulus to prices during the shift to inflation.

Chapter Two identifies the current legal and regulatory arrangements related to China’s electricity sector by examining the institutions and governing authority, pricing and tariff regulations, and investment approval. These regulatory aspects often determine the market features and characteristics of an electricity system. This chapter provides the foundation for understanding the design of critical supporting mechanisms adopted by the Renewable Energy Law and their implementation, which are discussed in the subsequent chapter.

This chapter focuses in particular on import restrictions and export controls as weapons of economic warfare as used against Russia, as opposed to the sanctions measures that are the focus of much of the book. These tools supplement the sanctions measures and help promote the same foreign policy ends through alternative means. For example, the chapter examines changes to Russia’s “most favored nation” status, and the resulting effect on imports into the U.S. from Russia. Import bans were also implemented on many items from Russia in multiple jurisdictions. Export controls of high-tech items are also discussed.

Chapter 7 delves into the reformers often-futile attempts to solicit potential non-official allies such as the Lancashire textile manufacturers and Anglo-Indian planters who sought access to raw cotton and land freeholds. While it initially seemed that the mobilization of the mill owners might deter arbitrary colonial governance, they failed to back the reformers’ radical efforts to alter India’s bureaucratic apparatus after the Uprising of 1857. Disappointed on a second front, reformers were also compelled to condemn the European planters whose exploitative tactics resulted in agrarian disturbances. As Manchester cotton lords in the 1870s continued to harp on the inequity of the colonial import duties levied on their textiles, reformers accused them of weaponizing free trade and stifling Indian competition. Recurrent famines also brought the efficacy of laissez-faire governance into question, which in turn led a faction within the East India Association to espouse a racialized variant of conservationism.

At the heart of the multilateral trading system is the commitment to nondiscrimination, the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle, mandating that all nations participate on equal terms. Added to this are a series of obligations to limit government interventions in trade. To give assurance that the system will deliver what it promises, transparency is required, making clear to all the measures that affect trade. Reality diverges from the ideal.

In the decades before the First World War, Europeans developed new institutions and information networks to try to understand and manage a rapidly changing world economy. This was a diffuse organizational web without a clear institutional centre, but it was grounded in an increasingly standardized and professionalized set of treaty practices. This chapter traces Lucien Coquet, Hubert Llewellyn Smith, Bernhard Harms, and Richard Riedl as they began to build careers in a globalizing economy that was marked by sharp social and political tensions.

The United States was one of the world’s first modern nations and one of the first to break free from colonial rule. It therefore stands at the beginning of the history of economic nationalism. This chapter analyses how nationalist thinking on the economy evolved in the USA from the Revolution to the Civil War. During this era, nationalists shifted from an outward-focused system aiming for economic development to an inward-focussed system based on protection. Developmental ideas were first championed by Alexander Hamilton, but his elitist conception of economic policy did not sit easily with the democratising ethos of the new nation. Economic nationalism became a mass movement as intellectuals like Daniel Raymond, politicians such as Henry Clay and activists in the mould of Mathew Carey jostled over questions of trade, manufacturing and banking. Instead of Hamilton’s close relationship between government and capitalists, the new movement put the everyday American producer at the centre. As it did so, isolationist ideas came to dominate. The intellectual capstone of this strand was provided by Henry Carey, whose influence would entrench a distinctly protectionist ‘American System’.

This Chapter examines the ongoing challenges of using regulation to manage plastic pollution. Specifically, the Chapter identifies the problem of ’thin law’ where laws exist that do not directly address the problem at hand or when they do address the problem at hand are engulfed in exceptions that allow for operations to continue according to the existing status quo. The Chapter highlights several examples of ’thin law’ that are incapable of addressing the scale of plastic pollution. The Chapter proposes the need for ’thick law’ intervention in the form of a regional or global waste tariff on single-use plastics and plastic fishing gear designed to reduce production of new plastics and increase reuse.

Chapter 1 provides a general overview of Qing fiscal policy, focusing on major changes in the early eighteenth and later nineteenth century. After an attempt to reform the agricultural tax apparatus in the early eighteenth century lost steam amid accusations of “snatching profit from the people,” the central government made no further attempts to modify it until the mid-nineteenth century. In the meantime, nonagricultural taxes grew, but remained comparatively insignificant in total volume. As the economy grew, formal government revenue as a share of total economic output plunged from around 4 percent to barely 1 percent prior to the Opium War. Following a wave of mid-century political and financial crises, the government finally swung into action, implementing a number of major fiscal reforms, most notably the creation of a new commercial tax. The agricultural tax, however, remained stagnant at eighteenth century levels until the early twentieth century, when the Qing state was on the verge of total collapse. This stagnation had particularly crippling consequences for the Qing’s industrialization drive in the later nineteenth century.

The dispute over the Tariff of 1828 marked a turning point for interposition. State legislatures passed resolutions declaring protective tariffs unconstitutional, increasingly using more threatening language that echoed the doctrine of nullification John C. Calhoun advanced in the South Carolina Exposition of 1828. Calhoun’s arguments distorted Madison’s views and transformed traditional sounding the alarm interposition into an option for each state to nullify acts of the national government that it considered unconstitutional. Nullification prompted a national discussion about the nature of the Union, notably in the Webster–Hayne debate in the United States Senate in 1830.Nullifiers quoted the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and Madison’s Report of 1800 to justify their constitutional theory, but misunderstood Madison’s theoretical right of the people to interpose in the final resort and overlooked the sounding the alarm interposition of the resolutions. Madison rejected both nullification and secession and tried to explain what he meant by a complex federalism based on divided sovereignty, ultimately failing to correct misconceptions about his resolutions.

The chapter looks at Churchill’s economic ideas as a Liberal and then Conservative and their impact on his actions. Churchill was a free trader and accepted the self-correcting specie-flow mechanism of the Gold Standard. His political economy before 1914 rested on interventions to remove monopoly power and market imperfections that would allow ‘competitive selection’ by free enterprise and encourage individual responsibility. After the war, strains appeared in this coherent set of assumptions. Churchill’s tenure as chancellor was marked by creative accounting for pragmatic political reasons. He remained a devotee of sound finance and balanced budgets, and despite some reservations on the issue of the return of the Gold Standard, he could not go against the advice of Treasury officials and the Bank of England, or his own ‘deeply internalized convictions’ that coincided with their assumptions. After 1929 he took little systematic interest in economics. Churchill’s coherent political economy of free trade and the Gold Standard collapsed and he had nothing in its place.