Since the 2000s, migration within and into the European Economic Area (EEA) has increased significantly. Some migrants will retire in their destination countries. This makes questions about their retirement protection increasingly relevant for social policy. To address this, we examine past experience. Using the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), we compared the pensions of post-1945 migrants, who settled in their host country, with non-migrants. We considered migrants who moved into and within the EEA, from poorer and richer countries. Where pensions were lower we sought to explain this in relation to the migration literature. As expected, we found some evidence that migrants’ pensions were lower, although significant variations were observed between EEA migrants and non-EEA migrants. However, surprisingly there were few indications that migrant pensions were lower because migrants as a whole were disadvantaged through late labour market entry or employment discrimination. Instead educational disadvantage mattered most, particularly for the highly educated: all highly educated migrants received lower rewards for their human capital than comparable non-migrants. Migrants who settled in countries with less-protective pension systems were also disadvantaged. Making retirement outcomes for migrants more equal would, thus, mean improving career opportunities for highly educated migrants and steps towards more-inclusive pension systems everywhere.

In the context of emerging challenges and opportunities associated with population ageing, the study of inequality in active-ageing outcomes is critical to the design of appropriate and effective social policies. While there is much discussion about active ageing at the aggregate country level, little is known about inequality in active-ageing experiences within countries. Based on the existing literature on active ageing, this paper proposes an individual-level composite active ageing index based on Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) data. The individual-level nature of the index allows us to analyse inequality in experiences of active ageing within selected European countries. One important motivation behind measuring active ageing at the individual level is that it allows for a better understanding of unequal experiences of ageing, which may otherwise be masked in aggregate-level measures of active ageing. Results show large differences in the distribution of individual-level active ageing across the 13 European countries covered and across age groups. Furthermore, there is a positive association between the country-level active ageing index and the equality of its distribution within a country. Hence, countries with the lowest average active ageing index tend to have the most unequal distribution in active-ageing experiences. For nine European countries, where temporal data are also available, we find that inequality in active-ageing outcomes decreased in the period 2004 to 2013.

Recent research has shown that divorce reduces the likelihood of home-ownership. Even in later life, ever-divorced men and women display lower home-ownership rates than their married counterparts. There is, however, a lack of knowledge about the consequences of divorce for a majority of divorcees: those who remain in home-ownership or move back into home-ownership after an episode in rental housing. This paper investigates the economic costs of divorce by focusing on the housing wealth of ever-divorced home-owners in later life (age 50 and over), against the background of changing welfare and housing regimes. The empirical analysis is based on data from ten European countries that participated in the third and fourth waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE 2007/8 and 2011/2). Our analyses support an association between divorce experience and lower housing wealth holdings for men and women who remain in home-ownership after a divorce, or re-enter home-ownership after a spell in rental housing. This means that a divorce has negative housing consequences for a broader range of individuals than thus far assumed. In countries with a dynamic housing market and a deregulated housing finance system, ever-divorced home-owners are worse off than their married counterparts. In these countries, more elderly individuals with a weaker financial situation are able to remain in or regain access to (mortgaged) home-ownership, but at the cost of lower housing equity. Further research should focus on the implications (e.g. for wellbeing, economic position) of such cross-country variations.

Family resources may play an important role in the wellbeing of older people. In this paper, we examine the association between living arrangement and cognitive decline among people over 65 living in different European countries. The underlined hypothesis is that living with others (i.e. spouse or/and children) vis-à-vis living alone may have a positive role in maintaining cognitive functioning, but also that such beneficial influence varies according to the circumstances. To this end, we used data from the first two waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which provides indicators of several cognitive functions: orientation, immediate recall, delayed recall, verbal fluency and numeracy. Net of both the potential biases due to the selective attrition and the re-test effects, the evidence shows that the association between living arrangement and cognitive decline depends on the geographical area and on the starting level of cognitive function.

Following Reher's (1998) seminal paper on family ties in western Europe, the perspective that family solidarity patterns are divided between an individualistic north and a famialistic south has dominated the literature. We challenge this view and address the variability in intergenerational family solidarity within and across countries. Using multiple dimensions of intergenerational solidarity drawn from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe, we develop a typology of late-life families which is robust across northern, central and southern regions. The four types are: (a) descending familialism: living nearby, frequent contact, endorsement of family obligation norms, and primarily help in kind from parents to children, (b) ascending familialism: living nearby, frequent contact, endorsement of family obligation norms, and primarily help in kind from children to parents, (c) supportive-at-distance: not living nearby, frequent contact, refutation of family obligation norms, and primarily financial transfers from parents to adult children, (d) autonomous: not living nearby, little contact, refutation of family obligation norms, and few support exchanges. The four types are common in each European country, though the distributions differ. The findings suggest that scholars should abandon the idea that a particular country can be characterised by a single dominant type of late-life family. Socio-demographic differentials in family type follow predictable patterns, underscoring the validity of the developed typology.