We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected]
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In this book, Lydia Schumacher challenges the common assumption that early Franciscan thought simply reiterates the longstanding tradition of Augustine. She demonstrates how scholars from this tradition incorporated the work of Islamic and Jewish philosophers, whose works had recently been translated from Arabic, with a view to developing a unique approach to questions of human nature. These questions pertain to perennial philosophical concerns about the relationship between the body and the soul, the work of human cognition and sensation, and the power of free will. By highlighting the Arabic sources of early Franciscan views on these matters, Schumacher illustrates how scholars working in the early thirteenth century anticipated later developments in Franciscan thought which have often been described as novel or unprecedented. Above all, her study demonstrates that the early Franciscan philosophy of human nature was formulated with a view to bolstering the order's specific theological and religious ideals.
Early Franciscan theology exerted an important influence but remains insufficiently known. This chapter treats of English theologians Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon, and the work attributed to Alexander of Hales and his circle, the Summa Halensis. It discusses topics such as the Trinity, salvation and the nature of theological science.
Chapter 2 examines the reception of Aristotle’s action theory from the 1220s to 1277 and its influence on novel theories of free will developed in this period. It shows that the reception of Aristotle led to a “psychological turn”: instead of assuming the existence of free will, theologians began to argue for it by clarifying the nature of intellect and will, in which free will is grounded. The chapter canvasses the theories of free will in broad strokes from William of Auxerre to Bonaventure, and in more detail regarding Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant, whose views will provoke strong reactions. Following Aristotle closely, Aquinas understands choices as determined by the practical deliberation that precedes them; one chooses as one judges worth choosing, and one can choose otherwise only because deliberation allows one to judge otherwise. Appealing to the authority of Avicenna, Siger argues that what causes the will’s acts does so necessarily.
Chapter 2 explores how Franciscan theologians understood the similarities and differences between animals and humans. The Summa Halensis most frequently stressed clear difference and a strong boundary. Similarities were recognized, however, especially in relation to the corporeal. The Summa was not consistent in its approach to these similarities: sometimes they were simply natural features posing no moral or intellectual challenges, whereas on other occasions they were dangerously deceptive and symbolic of human sin. Bonaventure also accepted that in many respects the bodies of humans and animals were the same. Beyond this, however, he was not struck by much in the way of similarity. He took it for granted that humans were the most perfect animals, unique amongst animals in their possession of reason. Made in the image of God, humans related to God very differently from animals. Animals served humans, answering to their bodily and even emotional needs. Bearing symbolic meaning, they were God’s tools. Bonaventure did not see any of the similarities that underpinned more complex understandings in the work of others. For Bonaventure, the boundary between humans and animals was always clear-cut.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.