We study the interaction between dispersed and sticky information by assuming that firms receive private noisy signals about the state in an otherwise standard model of price setting with sticky information. We compute the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the firms’ pricing decisions and derive the resulting Phillips curve. The main effect of dispersion is to magnify the immediate impact of a given shock when the degree of stickiness is small. Its effect on persistence is minor: even when information is largely dispersed, a substantial amount of informational stickiness is needed to generate persistence in aggregate prices and inflation.

The Great Moderation is characterized as a period of stable macroeconomic conditions, especially with regard to inflation. Under the sticky information theory, this environment may provide a few incentives for agents to update information on inflation, thus, producing a new slope of the sticky information Phillips curve. We estimate the degree of information rigidity implied by the sticky information Phillips curve. Using threshold models, we identify two regimes of high and low inflation, finding that each identified regime is associated with a specific degree of information stickiness. This evidence is consistent with agents that update information faster when inflation is higher.

We model agents' endogenous updating of information sets over time under changing macroeconomic conditions. Building on sticky information models, the degree of inattentiveness is endogenized by allowing agents to choose between a costly full-information predictor and a costless sticky-information predictor. This is modeled as a choice between discrete alternatives under rational inattention. Recursive simulation shows that the dynamic equilibrium paths of aggregate variables are highly persistent and match the moments of U.S. data better than a model with fixed sticky information or with sticky prices, especially with regard to higher moments and the degree of persistence. Predictors are chosen in line with the predictions from rational inattention models, as the aggregate degree of attentiveness increases with rising variance of the forecast variable. Moreover, the model can generate hump-shaped impulse responses of inflation to a monetary policy shock if the degree of inattentiveness is sufficiently high.

This paper analyzes the behavior of a central bank under strong (“Knightian”) uncertainty when the short-run trade-off between output and inflation is represented by the sticky information Phillips curve proposed by Mankiw and Reis [Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4), 1295–1328 (2002)]. By solving the robust control problem analytically, we show why model uncertainty does not affect the optimal monetary policy response to demand and productivity shocks, whereas it causes a stronger reaction of the monetary policy instrument to a cost-push (i.e., markup) shock. Differently from what occurs in sticky price models, the antiattenuation effect can result in a degree of price level stabilization that is greater or less than that experienced in the rational expectation model, depending on the central bank's degree of conservatism. These results dramatically affect the rationale for delegating monetary policy to a central banker more conservative than the society.