Emergency provisions allow governments to intervene swiftly, but also create opportunities for political capture. We analyze how this tension plays out in the largest federal republic in the world, India. Article 356 of the Indian Constitution (known as president’s rule) allows the union (federal) cabinet to dismiss a functioning state government and dissolve the elected state legislature, if the federally appointed state governor recommends the dismissal due to political crises, natural disasters, riots, and so forth. Using an original panel dataset of Indian states from 1952 until 2019, we find that emergency provisions allow for political capture increasing federal dominance in India. We find that: (1) the likelihood of invoking Article 356 is almost exclusively determined by the political strength of the parties in majority/coalition governments at the state level; (2) emergencies like riots and natural disasters are not significant predictors of invoking Article 356; and (3) judicial safeguards added in 1994 significantly reduced the imposition of Article 356.

Nine out of ten countries currently have emergency provisions written into their constitutions, here simply referred to as emergency constitutions. The nature of these provisions remains poorly understood. We therefore aim at providing answers to two questions: (1) how much additional discretionary power do emergency constitutions allow and which political actors are given the additional power; and (2) is there a limited number of “typical” emergency constitutions that combine various aspects in similar or even identical fashion? To answer the first question we construct an Indicator of Emergency Powers (INEP) which takes six central elements of emergency provisions explicitly into account. To answer the second question, we draw on cluster analysis and identify six well-defined clusters. Both the INEP as well as the six clusters allow us to answer important follow-up questions such as what the factors are that determine a country’s choice of emergency constitution but also under what conditions governments are likely to declare a state of emergency given the prevalent emergency constitution.

The relationship between terrorist activities and states of emergency has never been explored in a cross-country perspective. This chapter is a first step to change that. Given that a terror act has been committed, what are the factors that lead governments to declare a state of emergency – or refrain from declaring it? And given that a state of emergency has been declared, what are the effects thereof? In this chapter, two world regions are analyzed: seventy-nine countries having Western-style constitutions and the member states of the Organization of Islamic Countries. We find that more terrorist incidents increase the likelihood of a state of emergency. Interestingly, emergencies are less likely to be declared in election years, supposedly because governments believe them to be unpopular. Once a state of emergency is declared, it generally leads to substantially more government repression. Finally, countries already under a state of emergency are more likely to suffer from additional terror attacks, challenging the effectiveness of states of emergency.

In this chapter, we ask two questions: (1) Does the constitutionalization of emergency provisions help governments to cope with disasters and other extraordinary events? (2) What particular parts of emergency constitutions fare best? We find that the more advantages emergency constitutions confer to the executive, the higher the number of people killed as a consequence of a natural disaster, controlling for its severity. As this is an unexpected result, we discuss a number of potential explanations, the most plausible being that governments use natural disasters as a pretext to enhance their power. Furthermore, the easier it is to call a state of emergency, the larger the negative effects on basic human rights. Interestingly, presidential democracies are better able to cope with natural disasters than parliamentary ones in terms of lives saved, whereas autocracies do significantly worse in the sense that empowerment rights seriously suffer in the aftermath of a disaster.

States of emergency are declared frequently in all parts of the world. Their declaration routinely implies a suspension of basic constitutional rights. In the last half century, it has become the norm for constitutions to contain an explicit “emergency constitution,” that is, the constitutionally safeguarded rules of operation for a state of emergency. This chapter asks whether inclusion of an emergency constitution can be legitimized by drawing on social contract theory, arguing that there are important arguments, both against and in favor of constitutionalized emergency provisions, and that social contract theory – as applied by economists – can be of some help when deciding whether to have, or not to have an emergency constitution.

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only caused millions to die and even more to lose their jobs, it has also prompted more governments to simultaneously declare a state of emergency than ever before enabling us to compare their decisions more directly. States of emergency usually imply the extension of executive powers that diminishes the powers of other branches of government, as well as the civil liberties of individuals. Here, we analyze the use of emergency provisions during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and find that it can be largely explained by drawing on political economy. It does, hence, not constitute an exception. We show that many governments have (mis-)used the pandemic as a pretext to curtail media freedom. We further show that executive decrees are considered a substitute for states of emergency by many governments.

The study of constitutional emergency provisions remains in its infancy. We present the first overview and analysis of how specific emergency provisions vary across the fifty US state constitutions. The emergency provisions vary considerably across states with the Texan constitution exhibiting the most limited provisions and Georgia the most expansive ones. A cluster analysis shows support for dividing the US constitutions into six “families” and reveals the Texan constitution as substantially different from the rest. We explore whether these constitutional choices may have been affected by disaster risk, prevailing ideology, state wealth, and other factors for which historical data exist. We provide tentative evidence showing that emergency provisions have a significant effect on both the number of fatalities as well as on the damage suffered in the aftermath of a natural disaster. Clearly, therefore, the paper has implications for constitutional policy.

Media freedom is often curtailed in the wake of terrorist attacks. In this chapter, we ask whether constitutional provisions that are intended – directly or indirectly – to protect media freedom affect the degree to which press freedom is curtailed after terrorist incidents. We find that neither provisions explicitly protecting media freedom nor provisions that might protect media freedom indirectly (such as those guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary) mitigate the post-terror curtailment of press freedom.

States of emergency do not only imply a significant change in the balance of powers between the three branches of government, they are also very frequently declared: between 1985 and 2014, at least 137 countries were subject to at least one such event. Our analysis shows that it is crucial to distinguish between states of emergency declared as a consequence of a natural disaster from those declared as a consequence of political turmoil. Distinguishing between the costs of declaring an emergency and its benefits, we find that the less costly it is to declare an emergency, the more emergencies will be called on the grounds of natural disasters but not on the grounds of political turmoil. This is, hence, more evidence that constitutions matter. Finally, emergencies based on political turmoil are more likely to be declared if an economic crisis is hitting the country, large natural disasters are more likely to lead to a state of emergency when more powers are allocated to the legislature, and results suggest that even military coup governments are subject to constitutional constraints.

Although nine out of ten countries have emergency provisions written into their constitutions, the nature of these provisions remains poorly understood. We therefore aim at providing first answers to two straightforward questions: (1) which factors cause the inclusion of emergency provisions into constitutions? and (2) given that emergency provisions are constitutionalized – which factors determine the type of emergency provisions enacted? We find that the way in which a country’s constitution is produced has important consequences for its emergency provisions: constitutional assemblies dominated by legislators are loath to grant the executive many extra powers. Further, emergency constitutions in countries with stronger veto institutions and higher average income allow more discretionary power. This also holds for countries that recently experienced a coup. Interestingly, countries prone to natural disasters and countries far from the equator allow less power.

In Chapter 5, the final case study examines the spate of Tibetans burning themselves alive in opposition to rule by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 2009. First delineating significant events in the relationship between the nation of Tibet and the PRC, prior to and through the Cultural Revolution, I describe the social, political, and cultural situation of Tibetans during their loss of their sovereign nation. Interrogating the most attested claims and desires of these self-immolators—called pawo or martyrs in Tibetan circles—I highlight the role Tibetan Buddhism plays in the conflict as target of the PRC, core of Tibetan identity, and solution to the crisis on the plateau. I connect that discussion to an analysis of the historical and religious bases for the practice of auto-cremation as a means of resistance and meritorious action. Drawing these arguments together, I conclude by describing the state of emergency within Tibet, most notable in lands which now exist within the internationally recognized borders of China. I conclude by showing how suffering is constructed as an affirmation of the truth of the Tibetan imaginary made plain in the burned bodies of pawo.

This chapter tracks how the measures on enemy aliens consolidated, evolved and transformed and how the number of enemy aliens grew and changed between 1915 and the beginning of 1917. In this period, policies against enemy aliens became more detailed and regulated new aspects of the enemy aliens’ lives. The chapter follows the processes of convergence and divergence among countries at war. It also deals with the policies adopted and implemented by countries such as Italy, Bulgaria, Romania and Portugal and its colonies that entered the war at a later stage. It also pays attention to the process that transformed enemy aliens into friendly aliens and vice versa. As the war ground on, while anti-alien feelings among the belligerent populations assumed an anti-Semitic and racial character, the warring governments put in place a two-way process that turned some enemy aliens into friendly aliens and citizens and subjects who belonged to specific national or religious minorities into aliens. This double process mainly concerned, directly and indirectly, the multi-ethnic empires at different stages of the war, and varied greatly from government to government.

This chapter opens the second part of the book and is the first of six entirely devoted to the First World War. It concentrates on the early months of the war and examines first of all the spread of the state of emergency throughout Europe and the British Empire. It then, while calculating the number of enemy aliens in the belligerent countries, describes the first measures against enemy aliens adopted by Britain, France, the Russian Empire and Japan on the one hand, and those taken by Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire on the other. It also spells out the diplomatic attempts at protecting enemy aliens, the reactions of the victims of the earliest provisions and the attitudes of the nationalistic public opinion, the spy fever, the spread of fake news and the popular responses to them. By the end of December 1914, each of the early participants in the war had set in motion the mechanism for dealing with enemy aliens. By the same date, the war against them had also become global, ranging from Europe to North America, from Oceania to India or Iran.

By examining laws, legislation, and legal processes, it is argued in chapter five that the legal system in Bahrain is becoming an increasingly comprehensive tool of repression. Despite the increasing standardisation of law, the arbitrary nature of its execution during political unrest highlights the continuity of particularistic features of tribal law embedded within a standardised system.Also, legal repression has been facilitated by the emergence of specific legal structures and processes. As a consequence, laws have often been enacted as reactionary measures to con-trol dissent, long outliving their initial utility while simultaneously generating future grievances. The extent of impunity as an enabling factor for repression is also investigated and highlighted. In particular, a re-examination of historical sources sheds new light on the trial of the al-Madani killers in 1977, and the trial of the Khawalid shaykhsin the 1920s. While the emergence of ‘rule by law’ instead of ‘rule of law’ is implicit, this chapter sheds light on the nuances within even those repressive authoritarian legal processes.

Chapter 3 focuses on the problem of accountability in global governance. It follows what happens when UN sanctions powers originally designed to discipline states are used to target individuals suspected of being associated with terrorism. It provides a detailed genealogical account of the emergence of the UN1267 Office of the Ombudsperson - a procedural mechanism created by the Security Council in 2009 to provide redress to listed individuals. Most scholars argue that the Ombudsperson is an important step in the right direction towards greater human rights compliance by international organisations. This chapter challenges this narrative of global legal progress by advancing two main arguments. First, that different actors in the listing assemblage enact fundamentally different versions of the list through their practice. The ISIL and Al-Qaida list is best thought of as what STS scholars call a ‘multiple object’. Second, the Ombudsperson is an important figure of legal expertise that helps contain this multiplicity and hold the different strands of the listing assemblage together. This chapter closes by arguing that the Ombudsperson’s delisting processes and practices are primarily concerned with embedding new forms of preemptive security, aligning different actors and smoothing over conflicts of the list.

After the Torrey Canyon tanker disaster off the English coast in 1967, when the UK Government invoked necessity for the purpose of justifying protective conduct that infringed on the rights of another state, the community of states started deliberations on a special emergency treaty regime for maritime casualties that led to the Intervention Convention. This chapter analyses this framework as a prototypical special regime for emergency situations in order to deduct lessons for a possible cyber emergency treaty.