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2 results

  • 8 - Neo-Stalnakerian Conditionals

  • from Part III - Developing Selection Semantics
  • Fabrizio Cariani, University of Maryland, College Park
  • Book:
    The Modal Future
    Published online:
    18 June 2021
    Print publication:
    01 July 2021, pp 136-160

  • Summary

    Chapter 8 shows that it is possible to reconstruct Stalnaker's semantics for conditionals by combining the present selectional analysis of will and a restrictor theory of conditionals in the style of Kratzer.

  • Chapter 10 - On justifying neurobiologicalism for consciousness

  • Edited by Simone Gozzano, Università degli Studi dell'Aquila, Italy, Christopher S. Hill, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book:
    New Perspectives on Type Identity
    Published online:
    05 April 2012
    Print publication:
    08 March 2012, pp 207-229

  • Summary

    The authors such as Papineau and Block and Stalnaker mounted a general critique of the thesis that property identities are closely connected to reductive explainability. Kim takes Putnam to argue that identity claims are ideally suited for the role of connecting principles or bridge laws. These identity claims are thus justified by the fact that they enable the reduction of classical thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and in this way contribute to a substantial simplification of the physical picture of the world. Broad developed a view of mechanistic, i.e. reductive, explanation that, in many respects, is very similar to that of Levine. For Levine, reductive explainability is connected with claims about the identity of properties. Frank Jackson has in recent times given an interesting new twist to the debate about physicalism. Reductive explainability in Broad's sense implies reductive explainability in Jackson's sense, but not vice versa.