In 1958-64, the Sino-Soviet dispute became the overriding problem for Chinese foreign policy. The two Khrushchev-Mao encounters in Peking in 1958 and 1959, together with the multiparty Communist conferences in Bucharest and Moscow in i960, fueled a growing dispute in the Sino-Soviet alliance that ultimately blew it apart in all but the formal sense. On the eve of the Moscow conference, the Soviet Union agreed to provide the People's Republic of China with assistance in developing nuclear weapons. Domestically, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) evoked open as well as private criticism from Khrushchev for its alleged emulation of 'war communism'. This chapter examines the handling of the Lebanon crisis, the Peking summit meeting, and the Quemoy bombardment and discusses the spillover effects of the GLF deserve mention. Developments in Laos revealed Peking's priority between cautious diplomacy and revolutionary violence. Finally, the chapter also discusses the Sino-Burmese border, Soviet-American relation, and Sino-Indian war.