The exercise of monopsony in labor markets is limited to one degree or another by public policy. Employer conduct aimed at creating monopsony power is governed by the Sherman Act of 1890, which forbids collusion among employers as well as competitively unreasonable conduct by a single employer.

This chapter discusses private suits and the prohibition of §1 and the sanctions for violations. Corporations are subject to fines while individuals may be fined and/or imprisoned. Section 1 forbids collusive restraints of trade. In the past, there was some confusion regarding the applicability of §1 to labor markets. These days are gone. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have issued their Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals in which the agencies make it crystal clear that they will pursue criminal convictions for collusion in labor markets. In addition to public sanctions, §4 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of action for antitrust victims.

While company law makes great efforts to maintain the separation of different legal entities, other areas of law increasingly emphasise the common responsibility of corporate groups. One of the fields shaping this emerging principle is competition law, where focusing on the whole group rather than its individual members is increasingly becoming the norm. But this approach is still far from being uniformly accepted. While EU competition law is pushing ahead, US antitrust law is said to take a rather critical stance. Against this background, this chapter examines the functions performed by a unitary perspective on corporate groups. The main goal is to show that at least three important functions must be distinguished in EU competition law, each of which has its own implications. Only when these are properly understood can it be determined where the group perspective is appropriate and where it is not. This is shown by the example of current discussions, for example, on the liability of sister companies and on possible applications in the area of liability for damages. Finally, the analysis in this chapter also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the different approaches in EU and US competition law.

This chapter provides an overview of the US Regulatory framework applicable to standardization. It discusses the US law and policy instruments codified in the NTTAA and the OMB Circular, as well as the procedural requirements for American national consensus standards introduced by the ANSI. Similar to the previous chapter on the EU, this chapter covers the value of private voluntary standards in US policies and legislation based on the judgments of the US courts. Likewise, it also discusses whether and when standards development organizations may breach the US antitrust provisions, in particular Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and the SDOAA.

This chapter provides an overview of the antitrust laws. We begin with some historical background and move on to explore the economic rationale for having a public policy that protects and promotes competition. The pertinent sections of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act are presented, and their coverage is explained briefly. The importance of both public and private enforcement efforts is discussed.

The chapter discusses the structure of public enforcement in the US antitrust system, with particular emphasis on the use of civil sanctions in public enforcement of laws governing marketplace competition, and a focus on civil sanctions under the Sherman Act, FTC Act, and parallel state law in the United States. It then argues that the use of civil sanctions in public enforcement is inextricable from the supporting remedial structure, including criminal enforcement and meaningful private enforcement. The chapter explains the theory of civil fines in law enforcement and reasons for a jurisdiction’s choosing one or the other form of sanctions. It then explains the structure of remedies for antitrust violations in the US system, highlighting the three forms of public enforcement and the backstop of private enforcement. It then turns to recent developments in civil remedies, including punitive fines as well as damages and related civil monetary relief. It criticizes the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Abbvie Inc. and interrogates the current Supreme Court case involving AMG Capital, inquiring whether AMG Capital might influence the interpretation of the FTC Act as it applies to competition law enforcement as well as consumer protection enforcement.

The application of the national antitrust laws to the activites of labor unions had been controversial almost from the beginning, and the controversy continued when the Department of Justice under Thurman Arnold used the antitrust laws to attack unions that used jurisdictional disputes with other unions as a vehicle to preserve their dominant position in construction labor markets. Felix Frankfurter wrote the Court’s opinion “integrating” the sttutes regulating labor unions and monopolies to cut back on Arnold’s campaign.