This chapter considers two arguments for international legal skepticism, both of which appeal to an alleged analytical connection between law and coercive enforcement.The first is the legal philosopher John Austin’s characterization of law as the command of a sovereign, or in H.L.A. Hart’s apt phrase, as orders backed by threats.The second treats the mode of enforcement found in the modern state as a necessary condition for the existence of law.If true, each of these conceptual claims provides a sound basis for international legal skepticism.There are compelling reasons to reject them both, however.

Chapter 3 specifically discusses the social practice account of legal obligation, an account that characterizes legal obligation as a social bond linking together those who are subject to the law. This account is paradigmatically defended by those espousing the so-called conception of law as a shared activity, which accordingly will constitute the main target of the discussion carried out in this chapter. In addressing this theoretical approach, I will contend that the social practice account faces insurmountable difficulties in conceptualizing the obligatory dimension of law and that even the most nuanced versions of the social practice account explain legal obligation in ways that range from incomplete to internally incoherent.