Modern science is systematic inquiry, not systematic knowledge. It cannot be defined by its method or by its metaphysics, since these are amended as inquiry progresses. The norms of science are therefore the business of science and represent empirical discoveries. Peirce’s conception of science is nontechnical and for that reason difficult: he identified it by its ’spirit’, a restless quest for concrete discovery fruitful of further discovery. Theory, then, is no longer the end of inquiry, a resting place, but is, instead, a means to further discovery. Whereas philosophical systems were meant to be coherent and comprehensive, a theory that grounds research cannot be complete and any incoherence in it is a stimulus, not a fatal flaw. But the pursuit of concrete knowledge requires specialization and an evolving network of specialists. Peirce reversed the usual deprecation of specialization: its aim is growth of a knowledge that transcends any individual consciousness.

The Industrial Revolution cannot readily be modelled if research is treated as a public, private or club good. Recent work on the knowledge commons and on ‘network’ and ‘anti-rival’ goods has offered more promising perspectives, but we have proposed that research is most suitably considered as a novel good, namely a ‘contribution good.’ A contribution good is a non-depletable good jointly available only to those who have contributed to its creation. Here we show that the Industrial Revolution, and some of the institutional developments that accompanied it, conform well with a contribution good model of technical change.

Nineteenth-century Europeans developed scientific methodologies that generated new knowledge about Africa through Eurocentric ideas about progress. These ideas became the foundation for the development episteme. The development episteme emerged out of both these scientific endeavors and the missionary-imperialist project to disseminate European Christianity, commerce, and “civilization” to Africans. Knowledge explorers, cartographers, medical doctors, biologists, economists, ethnologists, and other scientists produced about Africa facilitated colonization by claiming mastery over the continent’s environment and people. Europeans drew on this scientific information to assert their technological expertise and moral right to “civilize” Africans. European scholars suggested their expertise was needed because they knew Africans best. Yet the development episteme was formulated in dialogue with Africans whose own knowledge and interests often determined which development efforts would succeed and which would fail. Many Africans working for Europeans were educated in Western, most often missionary schools. As such, African assistants were adept at filtering information through a Western lens. This filter transformed African knowledge into European “facts.” More recently scholars of the global north have introduced forms of knowledge about Africa that do not perpetuate the notion of Western superiority, but that still rely on some of the assumptions built into nineteenth-century European epistemologies.

Scientific societies have a unique role to play in the promotion and protection of human rights. Indeed, their activities in support of human rights have increased in the past four decades. Yet, such activities remain rare. Recognizing the connections between human rights and the knowledge and practice of psychology, the American Psychological Association (APA) is one of the few scientific membership organizations to integrate human rights language into its governance instruments and to pursue activities with a human rights focus. At the same time, the organization in recent years struggled to reconcile a perceived tension between human rights and national security interests. Adopting the APA as a case study, the chapter applies the Risse, Ropp, and Sikkin Spiral Model to explore how competing pressures from governments and other groups may lead scientific societies generally to take actions that undermine human rights norms and suggests a path forward for effective implementation by scientific societies of human rights.