In response to Putin's invasion of Ukraine, the West imposed a package of unprecedented sanctions that has failed to generate meaningful domestic backlash against Putin's war. Leveraging extant research on the survival of authoritarian regimes under economic sanctions, I show that their devastating economic costs notwithstanding, sanctions are unlikely to destabilize Putin's regime or pressure him to withdraw his troops from Ukraine. The key to explaining this outcome is to zero in on the incentive structure of the groups of individuals that make up Putin's inner circle.

International courts and tribunals so far have shown reluctance to delimit the normative scope of the essential security and necessity exceptions in international economic law. Legal scholars have also refrained from identifying the point of equilibrium between maintaining the core protections of international law and allowing for necessary flexibility in its application. This article argues that such stances are now untenable. The unilateral US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, and the reintroduction of sanctions, has challenged the multilateral order. Although the sanctions resemble earlier measures, violation of the deal and of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231(2015) has altered the normative context. The threat to the stability of the post-war multilateral order by a permanent member of the Security Council is unique. The author shows why Iran’s recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in this context should become a landmark case for international economic law and how it traps the ICJ in a gilded cage.