During his visit to Ethiopia in 1968, the shah spoke to representatives of the Organisation of African Unity about his commitment to combatting colonialism and racial discrimination. It is surprising, therefore, that not long after the shah had returned to Iran, his diplomats began to discuss with South African diplomats the establishment of political relations between the two countries. The chapter explores the origins of this engagement and examines what drove the two sides together in this period. At the United Nations and other international forums, the shah and his diplomats spoke out in harsh terms against discrimination, racism and human rights violations in Southern Africa. But in spite of this public condemnation, the shah developed and maintained strong security and economic ties with apartheid South Africa. The chapter questions to what extent the shah was able to maintain his position as a champion of independence and human dignity, while enjoying such friendly ties with the apartheid regime.

In the twentieth century, Western oil companies worked to combat the oversupply of oil on world markets through oligopolistic management of production and competition. At the same time, they attempted to contain petro-nationalism in the oil-producing Global South. The rise of the Pahlavi regime in Iran threatened the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, until World War II led to the abdication of Reza Shah and the occupation of Iran, including its oil fields, by Allied forces. American advisors came to Iran determined to “cure” what they saw as a sick and unstable country, while US oil companies attempted to break the British monopoly on Iranian oil. The Azerbaijan Crisis and Cold War clarified US policy, producing an American commitment to safeguarding Iran’s territorial integrity by backing the young shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and ensuring the smooth flow of Iranian oil into the global market managed by the oil oligopoly.

This concluding chapter summarizes the main thesis of the book, recapping the rise, consolidation, decay, and ultimate fall of the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties, pointing to the weak processes of instiotutionalization in both dynasties and their inability to forge meaningful ties with social classes that would enable them to survive political crises.

For much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Iran was the scene of competition and rivalry by the dominant global powers at the time, Britain and Russia, and later the Soviet Union. Iran managed to remain nominally independent under both the Qajars and the Pahlavis, but for long periods of time that independence was hardly meaningful. Over the course of the century that this chapter covers, from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s, the country experienced prolonged periods of foreign economic domination, political subjugation, and outright military occupation. Situated in a geography of increasing strategic significance, Iran was, in fact, one of the primary areas in which the Russians and the British played out a great game of high-stakes international chess, almost always to the detriment of local peoples and leaders.

This chapter examines the steady decline and ultimate collapse of the Qajar dynasty and the subsequent establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty. It examines the rise of the dynasty’s founder, Reza Khan, and the social and political context within which the new monarch sought to implement a series of far-reaching social and cultural initiatives designed to modernize the country. A strong central state was established, local rebellions were put down, and various bureaucratic institution were founded in order to affect social change and foster economic development. New, modern schools proliferated across the country. But Reza Shah’s reforms remained ultimately devoid of institutional support, and many were therefore abandoned or altogether reversed when he was removed from office by the British.

In the late 1920s, at the same time as the centralization of Iran’s legal system, the nascent Pahlavi state inaugurated a carceral system and imaginary in which modern prisons were promoted as necessary and progressive solutions to myriad social crises. In this era, Pahlavi statesmen and law enforcement officials attended conferences on policing and prisons in Europe, drawing architectures and techniques of punishment from those sources and working to dramatically expand Iran’s carceral system. This chapter examines state discourses on the prison in the aftermath of legal centralization and argues the mid-century Iranian government claimed its new-look prison system as a success story in its modernizing efforts. By vastly expanding Iran’s prison system and extolling the social virtues of its penal factories and literacy classes, the Pahlavi government marked the prison as a space of rehabilitation in which the bad criminal could be reformed into the good citizen, normalizing the incarceration of increasing numbers of Iranians in the process. This chapter also examines the establishment of the academic field of criminology in Iran, which emerged at the same time as these state-led reform efforts. Charting the rise of social scientific debates on crime and punishment, this chapter argues that this new academic discipline mapped onto the state’s modernizing sentiments regarding productivity, citizenship, rehabilitation, and modern progress.

This chapter is a political memoir on political activism in the late 1960s, in a small town of Golpayegan. The story of political activism and intellectual life in a small town illuminates the prerevolutionary period in Iran. Similarities link political and cultural sensibilities in the modernizing capital and a “religious” town such as Golpayegan.Political Islamism or the many streams of Marxism were formed in Golpayegan through the lived experience of ordinary people. Even in the late 1960s, young high school students passionately embraced transnational experiences through books, newspapers, magazines, and the study of such foreign languages as Arabic. Other institutional mediums included schooling, transnational religious exchanges, and technology (radio and cassettes recordings). Golpayegan was a fertile zone of transnational and transregional exchange. While living in Golpayegan, the author was fascinated by the outside world. Its cultural trappings were more accessible than one might think. The author loved listening to foreign radio, in English or Arabic and Farsi, through stations based in East Berlin, Baghdad, and Peking. He also listened to BBC in Persian and read, whenever possible, Time Magazine and Newsweek.

This chapter analyzes Iran’s policy toward the Persian Gulf during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi. The analysis is roughly divided into three periods: the years of 1925‒1932, during which time Reza Shah's court minister, Teymurtash, tried unsuccessfully to regularize the situation in the Persian Gulf through negotiations with the British government; the year of 1933 during which time various crises in the Persian Gulf arising from local challenges to British authority became part of the negotiation process; and the period of 1934‒1941 during which time Iran, encouraged by British withdrawal from Hengam and Basidu, strengthened its reliance on the tactics of deception, bluff, and intrigue in pursuit of its aspiration to obtain a paramount position in the Persian Gulf. This analysis is preceded by a brief discussion of the nature of the Pahlavi state because it provides the necessary context for Iran’s policy toward the Persian Gulf.