In this article, we analyze how the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which signalizes the overall (positive) progress and development of the potential candidate country of the post-Yugoslav space, is not straightforwardly translated as a benchmark for progress and development by the political elite. Drawing on securitization theory in order to understand the grammar of security, the wider discursive context, and the position of power and authority in RS during the analyzed period – and informed by the triangulation of content and discourse analysis – we show how the negotiations for the SAA were (mis)used in order to present both the “internal and external Other” as an existential threat for Republika Srpska. Our analysis shows that although the securitizing acts of the political elite from RS did not succeed in terms of the final outcome as the SAA was signed, certain security narratives, which are present in the contemporary sociopolitical landscape in BiH, have been constructed during this period and embedded into the wider discursive context and consolidated the position of power and authority of Milorad Dodik’s SNSD.

The theory and practice of referenda played an important role in the break-up of Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), where two divisive referenda preceded the Bosnian War of 1992-1995. After the failure of constitutional reforms in April 2006, Milorad Dodik, then Republika Srpska's prime minister, suggested that Republika Srpska had the right to hold its own referendum, with separation from Bosnia an unstated (yet soon openly discussed) aspiration. This paper presents an account of the emergence of Republika Srpska referendum discourse and how it was articulated by Milorad Dodik to establish his SNSD party as the dominant force in Republika Srpska. It documents the dialogical context and rhetorical gambits used by Dodik to articulate the discourse, tracing how it evolved in response to regional events and elections. The paper concludes by considering the limits of interpreting Dodik as a demagogue and of a discourse-centered approach to political rhetoric.

The history of modern Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) is a history of referenda. The referendum as a tool to shape the political fate and future of a particular society has seemingly always been an integral part of the Bosnian past. The first two referenda in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of the so-called “democratic era” following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia marked the beginning of a period of war and violence in the country. The referendum in November 1991, organized by the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and asking participants about the status of BiH within the Yugoslav federation, was the first step toward the formation of Republika Srpska (RS). On the other side, the referendum in March 1992 about the question of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia, which was attended by Bosnian Muslims and Croats and boycotted by the Serbs, plunged Bosnia into war.

Writing about the rhetoric of Milorad Dodik, one certainly has to bear in mind his beginnings, especially as a 1998 RS prime minister whom Albright (1998) called a “breath of fresh air” and someone “determined to peacebuilding, reconciliation and connection of democratic alternative” in Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth BiH). Dodik's early rhetoric that brought him to power abounded in phrases such as “economic progress,” “debt return,” and “opening to the world,” while some media reports referred to him as the “America-supported man who occasionally attended Ambassador Miller's secret dinners” (Dani, 22 September 2000) (Majstorovic et al. 2010). In 1998, Dodik attended donors’ conferences and was given significant support to pursue the reforms he started, including normalization of relations with the BiH Federation and Croatia. In 1998, his results secured him between $400 million and $600 million in aid money (Beta, 13 May 1998).